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symbols also have nonconfessional secular meaning (in the United
States) or whether their confessional meaning is at least absent (in
Europe). Yet both the United States Supreme Court (USSCt) and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) lack a workable approach to
determining whether secular meaning is present or confessional meaning
absent.
The problem is that the government can nearly always articulate
a possible secular meaning for the confessional symbols that it uses, or
argue that the confessional meaning is passive and ineffective. What
matters, however, is not the possibility that secular meaning is present or
confessional meaning absent, but whether this presence or absence is
historically and culturally authentic. Courts largely ignore this, routinely
appealing to history and culture to justify government use of confessional
symbols without undertaking a serious investigation of either one.
Drawing on the work of C.S. Peirce, we propose that courts ask
three successive questions in religious symbol cases:
(1) Is the ordinary meaning of the symbol
confessional or otherwise religious?
(2) Does the immediate context in which the
symbol is displayed suggest a possible historical,
cultural, or other secular meaning?
(3) Is this alternate secular meaning authentically
present and genuinely recognized in the history and
culture of the place where the symbol is displayed?
We illustrate this approach with Salazar v. Buono, in which the
USSCt upheld government display of a Christian cross, and Lautsi &
Others v. Italy, in which the ECtHR deferred to Italian court decisions
upholding government display of a Catholic crucifix. While the USSCt
in Buono and the Italian courts in Lautsi imagine conceivable
nonconfessional meanings for the confessional symbol at issue, neither
meaning can be found in American or Italian history or culture. In Lautsi,
therefore, the ECtHR ends up deferring to an Italian "tradition" that
doesn't exist.
Judicial denial of obvious confessional meaning and invention of
substitute secular meanings for confessional symbols betrays a cultural
schizophrenia: majoritarian religions rail against the secularization of
culture and its subversion of belief, yet they insist that their confessional
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symbols remain at home in this culture. But confessional symbols no
longer fit in mainstream culture as confessional-hence the
characterization of their meanings as secular or passive, even and
especially by the majoritarian religions that use them. Ironically, judicial
secularization or minimization of the meaning of these symbols to
validate their use by government is likely to accelerate and entrench the
very secularization that such religions deplore.
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INTRODUCTION: DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLIC MEANING
Under the constitutional norms of both the United States and
Europe the critical inquiry when a government displays a religious
symbol is what the symbol means. Symbolic meaning that coerces or
endorses religion violates the United States Constitution's Establishment
Clause,' while meaning that threatens religious pluralism or minority
religious liberty violates the European Convention on Human Rights (the
"Convention"). 2
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. I ("Congress shall pass no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... "); e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005) (finding that government's desire to endorse Christianity motivated display of
Ten Commandments in county courthouse); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(finding that government-sponsored graduation prayer psychologically coerced
students and their families to participate in a religious ceremony); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that display of Christmas nativity
in county courthouse constituted endorsement of Christianity); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980) (finding that display of Ten Commandments in public school might
coerce Christian belief in impressionable schoolchildren).
2. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention].
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity
with their own religions and philosophical convictions.
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In the United States and Europe, then, the legality of government
display of a religious symbol depends on whether the symbol possesses
nonconfessional significance or, at least, lacks meaningful confessional
significance. Yet both the United States Supreme Court (USSCt) and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) lack a workable approach to
the crucial determination whether the required secular meaning is
actually present or the prohibited confessional meaning really absent.
Two recent religious symbol cases illustrate the doctrinal
problem. In Salazar v. Buono,3 a plurality of the USSCt rested its
decision on the purportedly secular meaning of a large white Latin cross
at a World War I veterans memorial located in the midst of a vast tract of
federal park land. The plurality denied that the cross symbolized only
Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Protocol No. 1), art. 2 (1952), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/treaties/html/009.htm.
The European Convention, of course, contains no anti-establishment clause, but
numerous scholars have observed that ECtHR decisions and other sources of law in
the EU have been steadily converging on such a norm. See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt,
Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991 (2012) [hereinafter
Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment] (arguing that ECtHR decisions, the
European Convention, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Constitution for
Europe, and other EU sources of law have converged on a nonestablishment norm);
see also Silvio Ferrari, State Supported Display of Religious Symbols in Public
Space, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 7, 11-12 (2013) (observing that European countries
deal with religious symbols by wholly secularizing public space (France),
characterizing the dominant religion as underwriting the cultural identity of the
country (Italy) or prohibiting government use of symbols but permitting their display
by government employees (UK)); Susanna Mancini, Taking Secularism (not too)
Seriously: the Italian "crucifix case", I RELIG. & HUM. RTS. 179, 180 (2006)
(arguing that "a secular state is the pre-condition for any functional religious
accommodation and for the protection of minority religions and convictions.");
RELIGARE BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 19 (Nov. 2012), http://www.religareproject.eu
(arguing that EU country practices relating to law and religion should be governed
by a normative principal of "inclusive even-handedness").
3. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 371 F.3d
543 (9th Cir. 2004), on motion to enforcejudg., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal.
2005), aff'd sub nom. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007),
amended & superseded on denial of reh. en banc, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
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Christianity and the Christian resurrection, insisting that it additionally
• • 4
memorialized the sacrifices of U.S. military veterans.
In Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Italian courts found that crucifixes
posted in public school classrooms signified the Christian roots of liberal
democracy rather than Roman Catholicism; a Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR then held under the margin-of-appreciation doctrine that this
practice did not violate the Convention or threaten related principles of
religious pluralism or minority religious liberty because the crucifix is a
mere "passive" symbol that exerts no effect on non-Catholic students in
6the absence of other evidence of religious coercion.
4. 559 U.S. at 721 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); see also Buono v.
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 2008) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) ("While the cross at Sunrise Rock takes the form of an
ordinarily religious symbol, it serves the secular purpose of memorializing fallen
soldiers .... [T]he lack of any challenge to the Sunrise Rock memorial for seven
decades surely demonstrates that the public understands and accepts its secular
commemorative purpose.") (emphasis in original).
5. TAR Veneto prima Sez. 1, 13 novembre 2003, Sent. N. 56/04, Ric. No.
2007/02, referral remanded for lack of juris., Corte Cost., 13 dicembre 2004,
Ordinanza N. 389, on remand, TAR Veneto prima Sez. I1, 17 marzo 2005, Sent. N.
1110/2005, Ric. N. 2007./02, aff'd, Cons. Stato, 13 gennaio 2006, Decisione N.
556/06, N. 7314/2005 Reg. Dec., rev'd in part sub nom. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No.
30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) [hereinafter Lautsi], rev'd sub. nom. Lautsi & Others
v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) [hereinafter Lautsi & Others]; see
also Lautsi v. Italy: English Translations of Italian Administrative Trial & Appellate
Opinions, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2361188 (Fredick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale
Annicehino trans. Nov. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Lautsi - English Translations].
6. Lautsi & Others, at 29 70, 72 (internal cross-reference omitted).
For a pointed critique of the position that religious symbols are "passive" signs
that exert no material effect on unbelievers or adherents to other religions, see
Claudia Haupt, Active Symbols, 55 B.C. L. REV. 821, 822 (2014) [hereinafter Haupt,
Active Symbols] ("Characterizing religious symbols as passive is descriptively
inaccurate, doctrinally incoherent, and analytically unsound.").
The "margin of appreciation" doctrine permits the ECtHR "to assume, on
certain issues, an attitude of deference with respect to decisions of [contracting]
States that apparently impact rights guaranteed" by the Convention. Pasquale
Annicchino, Tra Margine di Apprezzamento e Neutralit&t: l Caso Lautsi> e I Nuovi
Equilibri della Tutela Europea della Libertei Religiosa, in DiRITrO E RELIGIONE IN
EUROPA 179, 181 (Roberto Mazzola ed. 2012) (authors' translation). The ECtHR
generally uses the doctrine to avoid making a definitive rule with respect to
questions that are particularly complicated or controversial or as to which the
contracting states have not reached consensus. Id. at 182. For a general introduction,
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The plurality opinion in Buono and the opinions of the Italian
courts in Lautsi depend on whether the confessional symbol in each case
actually had the nonconfessional meaning and effect asserted for it, while
the Grand Chamber's opinion depends on the absence of any religious
symbolic meaning at all. None of these courts, however, made a
persuasive case for the presence or absence of the meaning and effect on
which everything seemed to depend. 7 The Buono plurality's contention
that the veterans memorial cross also signified secular honor of military
sacrifice is the classic ipse dixit.8 The Italian courts did little better,
baldly asserting a secular cultural-historical meaning that supposedly
see G. LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (2007).
In applying the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, the ECtHR accepted Italy's
self-serving representation that its public schools are models of religious pluralism,
neutrality, and minority liberty. Lautsi & Others, at 30 74 (internal citation
omitted). Commentators have criticized this credulous account of the treatment of
religious minorities (and especially Muslims) in Italian public schools. See, e.g.,
Allison Mawhinney, Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children: A Semiotic Cocktail, in
THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 93, 109-10 (Jeroen Temperman ed., 2012)
[hereinafter THE LAUTSI PAPERS]. But see S. Ferrari, supra note 2, at 21-22 ("Today,
not only Christmas but also the end of Ramadan and other religious holidays are
celebrated in Italian schools.").
7. See Thomas C. Berg, Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols Promote
Religious Liberty?, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 23, 43 (2013) ("[T]he Italian courts
offered a selective and contestable interpretation of Christianity that, they said,
served as the ground for religious freedom and lacit6."); S. Ferrari, supra note 2, at
16 ("[T]he Italian courts' insistence on the exclusively cultural significance of the
classroom crucifix is the most unsatisfactory element of their reasoning on the
question.").
It is sometimes argued that the purely religious or confessional meaning or
effect of a symbol need not invalidate its use by government. See, e.g., McCreary
Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Establishment Clause permits government endorsement of monotheism and
disregard of polytheists and unbelievers); cf ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013) (same with respect to "religion in
general" when articulated at a "high level of abstraction"). Because we take as a
premise that the U.S. and European law requires that religious symbols be
understood to have secular or (at least) nonconfessional meaning and effect when
displayed by government, see supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text, we do not
address these arguments.
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2009) ("[S]omething asserted but
not proved.").
20141
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crowded out the ordinary Roman Catholic meaning of the classroom
crucifix. The ECtHR, meanwhile, simply proclaimed that a classroom
crucifix projects no confessional influence at all despite its status as the
quintessential symbol of Italy's majority Catholic faith. 9 Lacking in the
USSCt and the Italian court cases was any serious investigation of
whether the supposed "historical-cultural" meanings and effects
attributed to cross and crucifix are real or imagined-that is, present and
recognizable in American and Italian history and culture, or simply
made-up to justify government use of the symbols. The courts appeal to
history and culture in both cases, yet their historical and cultural findings
are mere assertions or speculations, as if "history" and "culture" are
properly invented in chambers.
Academic literature reflects the same problem. Commentary on
government use of religious symbols is legion, 0 much of it prompted by
Buono and Lautsi themselves.'1 Like the USSCt and Italian courts,
9. Lautsi & Others, at 29 72.
10. See, e.g., 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 69-86 (2008); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE
RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE 65-80 (1995); KOPPELMAN, supra note 7, at 73-76; Lorie G.
Beaman, Battles over Symbols: The "Religion" of the Minority Versus the
"Culture" of the Majority, 28 J.L. & RELIG. 67 (2013); Gerard V. Bradley, The Wren
Cross Controversy: Religion and the Public University, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2217 (2008); Caroline Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 347 (2012); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context.: A
Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2005)
[hereinafter Hill, Religious Symbolism]; RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison:
Private Speech, Government Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays,
2010 BYU L. REV. 2045 (2010); Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored
Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations and Expedient Post-Modernism,
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211 (2011); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We
See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986);
Frank S. Ravitch, Religious Objects As Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1011 (2005); Joshua D. Zarrow, Note, Of Crosses and Crches: The Establishment
Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REV.
477 (1986). See also Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic
Meaning: Toward a First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261
(2004).
11. See, e.g., CARLO CARDIA, IDENTITA RELIGIOSA E CULTURALE EUROPEA: LA
QUESTIONE DEL CROCIFISSO (2010); KOPPELMAN, supra note 7, at 75-76; Ian
Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 104 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1653 (2010); Berg, supra note 7; Giuseppe Casuscelli, 11 crocifisso nelle
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however, commentators generally assume the presence of permissible
historical-cultural meanings or the absence of prohibited confessional
ones without seriously investigating either history or culture. 12 The
sculole: neutraliti dello Stato e (eregola della precauzione', OLIR: OSSERVATORIO
DELLE LIBERTA ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGIOSE (July 2005), available at www.olir.it; Jlia
Pasquali Cerioli, Laicith dello stato ed esposizione del crocifisso: brevi note sul
(diffcile) rapport tra la presenza del simbolo religioso nelle strutture publicche e il
principio di separazione degli ordini, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE LIBERTA ED
ISTITUZIONI RELIGIOSE (July 2005), available at www.olir.it; S. Ferrari, supra note 2;
Adam Linkner, How Salazar v. Buono Synthesizes the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause Precedent into a Single Test, 25 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 57
(2011); Christopher C. Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment
Clause, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1387 (2011); Mancini, supra note 2; Andrea Pin, Public
Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights: The Italian
Separation of Church and State, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 95 (2011); Mary Elizabeth
Roper, Note, Secular Crosses and the Neutrality of Secularism: Reflections on the
Demands of Neutrality and its Consequences for Religious Symbols-the European
Court of Human Rights in Lautsi and the U.S. Supreme Court in Salazar, 45 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 841 (2012); Vincenzo Turchi, La pronuncia della Grande
Chambre della Corte di Strasburgo sul caso Lautsi C. Italia: post nubile Phoebus,
STATO, CHIESE E PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE (Oct. 2011), available at
www.statoeheise.it; J.H.H. Weiler, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from
Religion: The European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 759 (2013); John Witte, Jr. & Nina-
Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New European and American
Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV.. 5
(2011).
An important collection of commentary on Lautsi is THE LAUTSI PAPERS, supra
note 6.
12. See, e.g., CARDIA, supra note 11, at 112-22 (characterizing classroom
display of crucifix as secular signifier of roots of Italian culture based on quotations
from selected Italian liberals); Bartrum, supra note 11, at 1661-64 (speculating that
the Buono plurality might have properly concluded that the cross had lost
confessional meaning through display at military monuments and cemeteries);
Beaman, supra note 10 (assuming nonexistence of "culture" used to justify
government display of majoritarian symbols); Bradley, supra note 10, at 2262
(suggesting without demonstrating that the cross possesses "some meaning for
everyone as an example or illustration of certain universal values," like "love,"
"sacrifice," and perhaps "redemption"); Mawhinney, supra note 6, at 93 (asserting
that Italy's invocation of "historical-cultural" meaning for crucifix cynically
deployed Catholicism to define Italian identity); Weiler, supra note 11 (asserting that
crosses and crucifixes are symbols of national identity); Witte & Arnold, supra note
11, at 30, 52-53 (reading cases as permitting government display of confessional
symbols because they have historical and cultural meaning, despite failure of cases
to investigate history or culture); see also Lautsi & Others, at 38-43 (Bonello, J.,
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doctrinal results are predictable: thinly sourced and ultimately
unpersuasive judgments about purportedly present nonconfessional
meanings (or purportedly absent confessional ones) that underwrite the
validity of government displays of confessional symbols.
We propose that when the meaning of a confessional religious
symbol is at constitutional issue, courts should ask three successive
questions:
(1) Is the ordinary meaning of the symbol
confessional or otherwise religious?
13
(2) If so, does the immediate context in which the
symbol is displayed suggest an alternate secular
meaning for the confessional symbol?
14
(3) If so, is this alternate secular meaning
authentically present and genuinely recognized in
the history and culture in which the confessional
symbol is displayed?' 5
In short, we are proposing a consistent procedure for determining
the meaning of religious symbols, based upon their ordinary meaning,
concurring) (asserting that crucifix is customary secular symbol of Italian "cultural
personality").
Among the few exceptions are Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Cross at
College: Accommodation of Religion at Public Universities, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 939 (2008) (detailing history of Wren cross displayed within chapel at state-
owned College of William & Mary as basis for conclusion that display violated
Establishment Clause); B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi:
Ceremonial Deism and Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705 (2010)
[hereinafter Hill, Ceremonial Deism] (arguing that before a facially religious text
may be constitutionally used by government, it should be proved to have lost its
confessional force by a specific demonstration of history).
Finally, a few commentators have suggested the relevance of historical or
cultural analysis without specifying its analytical significance. See, e.g. Linkner,
supra note 11, at 75-78 (suggesting history as a supplement to the endorsement
test); Mark L. Movesesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious
Displays in the US and Europe, 1 OXFORD J.L. & RELIG. 338 (2012) (arguing that
differing U.S. and European doctrines for confessional symbols reflect different
cultural conceptions about the social purpose of religion).
13. See infra Part l.A.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part I.C.
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their immediate context, and their place in the culture and history of the
country in which they are displayed.
Buono and Lautsi exemplify the problems that arise from the
failure to carefully and systematically explore these dimensions of
religious symbolic meaning,16  and illustrate deeper trends of
secularization and acculturation highlighted by the historical-cultural• 17
dimension. We close with the suggestion that attempts by traditionally
dominant religions to defend government use of their confessional
symbols by manufacturing "secular" meanings or denying obvious
confessional ones only undermine authentic religious belief and hasten
the social irrelevance of such religions."
1. THREE MODES OF SYMBOLIC MEANING
American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce provided a useful
vocabulary for the dimensions of symbolic meaning. Peirce maintained
that a sign "conveys to the mind an idea about a thing,"'1 9 in three ways.
First, likenesses or "icons" imitate the things they represent, like a
photograph, an architectural plan, or certain Egyptian hieroglyphics.20
Second, "indications" or "indices" are linked to some thing or effect in
the world, like a street sign to the street it marks, smoke with fire, or a
greeting with the person to whom it is directed. 21 Finally, "general
signs," "tokens," or "symbols"-Peirce used all three terms
interchangeably-possess a significance acquired by custom, usage, or
convention, like a police officer's badge (signifying civil authority),- a
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part IIl.
18. See infra Conclusion.
19. 2 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (1893-1915) 5 (Peirce Edition Project ed., 1998); accord
1 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS (1867-1893) 225 (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) ("A
sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind.").
20. 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 5-6, 7; accord I PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 226
("Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished
from them."); 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 307 ("An icon .. possesses the quality
signified.").
21. 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 5.
CROSS, CRUCIFIX, CULTURE2014]
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
theatre ticket (signifying right of entrance), or a warning bell or buzzer
(signifying danger).
22
Most signs combine iconic, indicational, and conventional
meaning.23 For example, the traditional Christmas nativity or creche
iconically replicates the New Testament accounts of Jesus's birth,
because it is indexed to an event that Christians believe took place in
literal history, 24 and it is conventionally associated in the West with the
Christmas holiday celebrating the birth of the Christian Messiah and the
, 21
related hope of salvation through him.
Peirce's semiotics of icon, index, and token suggest three
inquiries necessary to ascertain the constitutionally relevant meaning of
confessional symbols displayed by government: the sign's ordinary
confessional meaning, based on its similarity to the idea or thing it
signifies; the sign's alternate meaning, based on whether the specific
context in which the sign is displayed might conceivably displace its
confessional meaning with a secular alternative; and the alternate
meaning's historical-cultural fit, based whether it is authentically present
22. 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 5; accord 1 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 225-26
(A token "is related to its object only in consequence of a mental association, and
depends upon a habit. Such signs are . . . for the most part, conventional or
arbitrary."); 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 9 (A symbol is "a conventional sign, or one
depending upon habit ... ").
23. See 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 10.
24. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 10, at 1213.
The nativity scene ... necessarily depicts the first of the two
miracles at the heart of Christianity. The nativity scene depicts
the incarnation of God in human form-or as much Christian
literature refers to it, the Incarnation with a capital I . . .
[W]ithout the Incarnation, the nativity scene becomes either a
meaningless arrangement of figures engaged in some
unidentifiable activity (which no one believes), or it becomes a
depiction of false worship-a depiction that would horrify its
sponsors. If you think about it even a little bit seriously, the
nativity scene can only represent the Christian belief in the
Incarnation.
Id. See also id. at 1214 ("[I]t seems rather odd to describe a miraculous event as
merely historical. But of course Christians who fully believe in the miracle believe
that it actually happened and that it happened in historic time. So from a Christian
perspective, the event is historical as well as miraculous.").
25. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 10, at 1212-14.
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and genuinely recognized in the history and culture of the place where it
is displayed.
A. Ordinary Confessional Meaning
"Ordinary meaning," as we employ it, is rooted in the notion of
"literal," "semantic," or "linguistic" meaning-that is, the meaning of a
26
text based on the rules of the language in which it is written. Consider
the sentence, "This chair is broken." By the rules of English spelling and
grammar, the combination of letters and words signifies (i) an object on
which people sit, generally having a seat, a back, and four legs, that is (ii)
deficient-missing a leg, or otherwise unstable, or having a seat worn
through or a missing back. This is the literal, semantic, or linguistic
meaning of the sentence.
The "ordinary" meaning of a symbol is analogous to semantic
meaning, constituting the object or idea that the symbol superficially
signifies according to the communicative rules of the culture in which it
is displayed, without attending to contextual details or deploying a very
thick cultural knowledge. Indeed, nonlinguistic confessional symbols are
the quintessential Peircean icon.27 Every religious sign displayed by the
government has an ordinary confessional meaning-a predominant
iconic meaning rooted in its similarity to a religious belief that has
cultural salience. To return to the Christian nativity, in the West it
ordinarily signifies the birth of the son of God to save the world from
death and sin. Strictly speaking, this meaning exceeds the purely
semantic or iconic: it literally depicts a group of adults in ancient garb
kneeling before a baby and a couple who appear to be its parents, in a
stable filled with barnyard animals. Thus, one needs a cursory knowledge
of Western culture-an awareness of the Gospel accounts of Jesus's
birth-to understand it as a common representation of that birth.
Similarly, a Latin cross merely imitates the most common form
of execution among the ancient Romans, and crucifixes only depict a
man nailed to such a cross. For anyone with a faint acquaintance with
26. See JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM
AFTER STRUCTURALISM 110-11 (1982).
27. See "Sign and Symbols," in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 437, 441
(Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
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Western culture, however, these signs are instantly recognizable as
symbols of Christianity-the Roman cross on which Jesus was
crucified-and Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy-Jesus nailed and
dying on that very cross. We refer to these as the "ordinary" meanings of
the cross and crucifix.
28
B. Alternate Secular Meaning
Peirce maintained that a correlative relationship exists between
29the indicational meaning of a sign and its object in the world. Certainly
the physical context in which a confessional sign is displayed will affect
the meaning of the sign, sometimes to the point of apparently displacing
its ordinary confessional meaning with another, secular meaning.
Consider, again, "This chair is broken." 30 It could constitute a
warning, if directed at someone about to sit on it: "This chair is broken,"
don't sit on it! But at a garage sale it could instead be an explanation:
"This chair is broken," I don't want to buy it. Or an accusation, from
someone who has fallen from it: "This chair is broken," you should have
told me! Although the linguistic meaning of the sentence remains the
same in each example, its performative meaning changes according to
the context in which it uttered. 3' As these examples illustrate, the
28. See infra Parts II.A.1 & ll.B.1.
29. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
30. The following performative examples are drawn from CULLER, supra note
26, at 113.
31. See ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 38 (Annette Lavers &
Colin Smith trans., 1967) ("T]he union of a signifier and a signified" does not
exhaust the semantic act, for the sign derives its value also from its surroundings.).
The relationship between an indicational sign and its object approximates the
"performative effect" of spoken language. See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS
WITH WORDS (2nd ed. 1975). Most utterances do not passively reflect or describe
the world, but also actively "do" something in it. See id. at 94. For example, when
uttered by a cleric or government official, "I now pronounce you husband and wife"
effects a legally binding marriage. See id. at 5.
Although Austin restricted his analysis of performatives to the spoken word,
others have applied it to signs. See, e.g., STEPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF
LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); NELSON GOODMAN,
LANGUAGES OF ART: AN APPROACH TO A THEORY OF SYMBOLS (1968); Hill,
Religious Symbolism, supra note 10, at 545.
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performative meaning of a sign depends on the context in which the
semantic meaning of the sign is deployed.
32
The meaning of confessional signs likewise depends on the
physical context in which they are displayed. Given the ordinary
meaning of the Christian nativity as a sign of Jesus's miraculous birth, its
placement on the lawn of a Protestant church identifies a place of
Christian worship. But a nativity displayed by itself in the lobby of a
courthouse might additionally imply Christian bias in the administration
of justice.33 And yet, the identical nativity in a commercial shopping
district surrounded by secular signs and symbols may find its ordinary
Christian significance diluted or entirely absent, displaced by another,
secular meaning according to which the nativity is simply a marker of the
winter holiday season celebrated by Christians, some nonChristians, and
most unbelievers.34
The significance of a religious sign displayed by the government
is not necessarily its ordinary confessional meaning. That meaning is
shaped, diluted, and sometimes wholly displaced by the physical context
in which the sign is displayed.
C. Historical-Cultural Presence
Signs have no "inherent" meaning-that is, there is no natural or
necessary relationship between a sign and the idea or object it signifies.
As Ferdinand de Saussure put it, the "bond between the signifier and the
signified is arbitrary." 35 "Arbitrary," however, does not mean "random"
32. Hill, Ceremonial Deism, supra note 12, at 36; see e.g., Brett Scharffs, The
Role of Judges in Determining the Meaning of Religious Symbols, in THE LAUTSI
PAPERS, supra note 6, at 35, 41 (arguing that flag-burning means something different
when conducted by "Palestinian protesters in the West Bank" or "a large crowd on
the Mall" than by "American Legionnaires or the Boy Scouts").
33. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); S. Ferrari,
supra note 2, at 19.
34. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 68 (1984). The holding in Lynch has
been widely criticized. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen & Charles Sims, The Nativity
Scene Case: An Error of Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837, 857 (1985); Frederick
Mark Gedicks, Lynch and the Lunacy of Secularized Religion, 12 NEV. L.J. 640,
642-43 (2012); Laycock, supra note 10, at 1213-14.
35. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 67 (Charles
Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., 1974).
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or "unconstrained," as if one might attribute any meaning whatever to a
sign; to the contrary, the only way that language and other signs can
function is through conventional rules governing meaning.36 "Arbitrary"
intends, rather, that the meaning of a sign is not rooted in the sign's
physical characteristics or is not otherwise latent within it, but is rather a
function of its relations with other signs in the cultures that use them.37
"Culture" consists of the "symbolic, imaginary system" that
legitimate a society's "political and social order., 38 The signs and
symbols that constitute a culture are generally used in regular and
conventional ways. 39 Roland Barthes metaphorically described this
regularity as "contractual, 40  like the pseudo-historical "social
contract.",41 Of course, the cultural contribution to a sign's meaning is a
legacy that precedes any particular use of the sign; the relation of sign
and signifier is thus arbitrary in principle (ex ante) but not in practice (ex
post).42
Religion is freighted with culture and vice versa. Each has grown
out of and informed the other. Religion, in other words, is
"inculturated"-accessed by and through the history and culture of its
adherents, at the same time that it is "of' that history and culture, "an
integral part" of it.43 Being Catholic, for example, has traditionally been
36. CULLER, supra note 26, at 114-15; TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY
97 (1983); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW' S EMPIRE 31 (1986) ("We follow shared
rules, they say, in using any word: these rules set out criteria that supply the word's
meaning.").
37. See EAGLETON, supra note 36, at 97.
38. OLIVIER ROY, HOLY IGNORANCE: WHEN RELIGION AND CULTURE PART
WAYS 26, 109 (2010); see also JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, To CHANGE THE WORLD:
THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN
WORLD 32, 35 (2010) ("Culture is, first and foremost, a normative order by which
we comprehend others, the larger world, and ourselves and through which we
individually and collectively order our experience .... Particularly in the cultural
meaning imputed to such things, culture can be understood as symbolic capital.")
(emphasis in original).
39. See Jack Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1135-36 (1990).
40. See BARTHES, supra note 31, at 51.
41. "Sign and Symbols," supra note 27, at 440.
42. BARTHES, supra note 31, at 51. See also MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS
39-44 (Richard C. McCleary trans., 1964).
43. ROY, supra note 38, at 26; see Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1020-21.
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an important part of being Irish--Catholicism informs what it means to
be Irish-but at the same time Catholicism has been accessed through
Irish history and culture-what it means to be a Irish has also informed
what it means to be Catholic.
Given the intimacy of religion, history, and culture, it is
possible-indeed, likely-that a society may so commonly and widely
deploy a confessional sign that it seems to lose its confessional character.
Such a sign might come to be used not only by adherents to the religion
it originally and ordinarily signified, but also by members of other faiths
44
and by unbelievers. Christmas trees and crosses on national flags are
examples of signs whose ordinary meaning has "crossed over" from the
confessional to the secular.45
1I. CROSS AND CRUCIFIX
A. Salazar v. Buono
Buono began as a challenge to a 10-foot high white Latin cross
displayed as a memorial to World War I veterans on federal park land in
California's Mojave Desert.46 The lower federal courts initially held that
display of the cross violated the Establishment Clause as an endorsement
of Christianity, 47 a ruling the federal government declined to appeal to
the USSCt. 48 To forestall permanent removal, Congress declared the
cross a National Memorial, prohibited the use of federal funds to remove
it, and transferred the few square yards on which it stood to the
nongovernmental American Legion.49 The original plaintiff then
obtained an order that these congressional actions violated the
44. Cf Zarrow, supra note 10, at 513 ("Neutrality among religions would be
assured if a member of a minority religion would view the symbol displayed as
secular or nondenominational.").
45. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 69-70.
46. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204-05 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
47. Id. at 1217.
48. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 709 (2010).
49. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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Establishment Clause. 50 This time, the government appealed to the
USSCt, and a plurality found the lower courts insufficiently attentive to
the possibility that the cross was a secular sign of military honor and
sacrifice that did not endorse Christianity and thus whose display by
government would be fully consistent with the Establishment Clause. 5' It
vacated the injunction and remanded the case for consideration of this
possibility.
52
1. Ordinary Meaning of the Cross
In the West a Latin cross, without more, is overwhelmingly
likely to be understood as the sign of Christianity and Christian belief,
since for Christians the cross has been the virtually exclusive emblem of
Jesus's resurrection and his related victory over death and sin for nearly
53two thousand years.
50. Id. at 1182.
51. 559 U.S. at 710-22.
52. Id. Justice Alito concurred on the Establishment Clause point, but thought
remand unnecessary. 559 U.S. at 722-29 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Justices Scalia and Thomas would have dismissed for
plaintiff/appellee's lack of Article III standing, because the cross became private
property after the transfer statute. 559 U.S. at 729-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor would have affirmed that the
transfer statute violated the Establishment Clause. 559 U.S. at 735-60 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Finally, Justice Breyer found the case controlled by general equitable
principles and thus would have dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question.
559 U.S. at 760-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Less than two weeks after Buono was decided the cross was stolen. See William
M. Welch, Vandals tear down cross that justices would not, USA TODAY, May 14,
2010, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-05-11 
-mojave-
desert-cross N.htm?csp=34. The lower courts have not yet taken any action on
remand.
53. See 2 J.H.A. BOMBERGER, THE PROTESTANT THEOLOGICAL &
ECCLESIASTICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 37 (Lindsay & Blakiston, 1860); RICHARD
HARRIES, THE PASSION IN ART 1 (2004); CYRIL E. POCKNEE, CROSS AND CRUCIFIX IN
CHRISTIAN WORSHIP AND DEVOTION 33 (1962); RICHARD VILADESAU, THE BEAUTY
OF THE CROSS: THE PASSION OF CHRIST IN THEOLOGY AND THE ARTS, FROM THE
CATACOMBS TO THE EVE OF THE RENAISSANCE 7 (2006) [hereinafter VILADESAU,
BEAUTY OF THE CROSS]; HARRIES, supra, at xi ("[l]n the earliest Christian art ... the
Cross and the Resurrection are seen in a unified manner as two aspects of one
triumph.").
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The Latin cross depicts a horizontal line most of the way up a
vertical line (" t "), and is believed to resemble the cross on which the
Romans crucified Jesus. 54 Another rendering is the Greek cross
composed of horizontal and vertical lines intersecting at their respective
midpoints (" + "), used predominantly by the Eastern Orthodox Christian
churches. Both versions are ubiquitous symbols of Christianity and
Christian belief, appearing on altars, gravestones, clerical vestments, and
military battle flags and banners (as in the Crusades); in sculpture,
painting, cemeteries, and architecture (especially in connection with
churches); and as personal jewelry and emblems of clerical office.
55
The cross is so closely linked to Christianity that its Christian
meaning generally displaces all others. 56 The various courts in Buono
were simply stating the semantically obvious in finding that the Latin
cross is "certainly a Christian symbol, ' '57 "the preeminent symbol of
Christianity, 58 "exclusively a Christian symbol, '59 and "not a symbol of
any other religion."
60
2. Alternate Secular Meaning at Veterans Memorial
Given the ordinary Christian meaning of the cross, its display by
government seems to align the government with Christianity. But this
effect may be displaced by another effect, depending on the particular
context in which the cross is displayed.
54. BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 37; Orazio Marucchi, "Archaeology of the
Cross and Crucifix," Catholic Encyclopedia, NEW ADVENT (1909), available at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04517a.htm.
55. POCKNEE, supra note 53, at 69-77; Marucchi, supra note 54, at 13-14.
56. BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 37 ("[The cross] must, like the atonement
completed upon it, be regarded as the most peculiar property of Christianity.");
Lund, supra note 11, at 1391, ("[T]he cross's religious meaning is undeniably
primary. The cross is the central symbol of the central event of Christian theology..
57. 559 U.S. at 715.
58. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 768-69 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002)), rev'd & remanded
sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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For example, crosses are customarily found on signs identifying
hospitals, pharmacies, and first-aid stations, a practice that remains
common in Europe and the United States.6 1 The placement of the cross
where healthcare services are available displaces its ordinary Christian
meaning with a secular meaning-a place where one might receive
62
medical care.
Similarly, crosses are sometimes a component of the corporate
logos of entities associated with healthcare services, such as Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, an international association of health insurance
companies, and the International Red Cross. The distinctive branding
effect of such logos differentiates their crosses from the Christian cross:
both Blue Cross/Blue Shield and the International Red Cross use the
Greek cross in addition to (obviously) coloring the cross in blue and red,
respectively. 63 The Greek cross is also generally used in the United
States and Europe as a traffic sign, displayed on a yellow or other
distinctively colored background to mark an approaching intersection.
A secular use of the Latin cross has also emerged in popular
culture. Actors, singers, members of rock bands, media figures, and
ordinary people often wear Latin crosses as jewelry. 4 While many wear
it as an emblem of personal Christian faith, others who wear it are often
widely known to have rejected Christianity, or wear it in situations that
65apparently contradict Christian beliefs.
61. Italian pharmacies, for example, are commonly marked with a lighted
green Greek cross, while Greek crosses on a blue background are displayed on U.S.
interstate highways to signal that a hospital is near an exit.
62. One can argue, of course, that even this context bears the trace of less
pluralist eras of Western history during which Christian clerics and missionaries
were virtually the only trained providers of health care.
63. See BLUECROSS AND BLUESHIELD ASSOCIATION, http://www.bcbs.com/;
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES,
http://www.ifrc.org/. As its official name suggests, "red cross" was not secular
enough for affiliates in Muslim societies.
64. See Scharffs, supra note 32, at 43-44.
65. Madonna's use of cross imagery in the video rendition of her hit, "Like a
Prayer," for example, was deemed blasphemous by many Christians. See, e.g.,
Vatican's fury over Madonna "blasphemy, " DAILY MAIL ONLINE,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-39893 1/Vaticans-fury-Madonna-
blasphemy.html. Additionally, we are reliably informed by Professor Gedicks's
daughter that a recent contestant on a well-known United States dating reality show
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In each of these situations, the ordinary Christian meaning of the
cross is successfully displaced by other, secular meanings made clear by
the precise physical context in which the cross is displayed.
The Buono plurality likewise portrayed the effect of displaying
the cross at a veterans memorial as having displaced its ordinary
Christian meaning, thus avoiding the unconstitutional Christian
endorsement that would otherwise seem to follow from its display by the
government. The Court maintained that the cross communicates a secular
meaning of memory and honor, at least when displayed at a war
memorial or veterans cemetery:
Although certainly a Christian symbol, the cross
was not emplaced on Sunrise Rock to promote a
Christian message. Placement of the cross on
Government-owned land was not an attempt to set
the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed.
Rather, those who erected the cross intended
66
simply to honor our Nation's fallen soldiers.
As confirmation of this meaning, the plurality pointed to the vast
number of crosses marking graves of fallen American servicemen in
61battlefield cemeteries.
In short, the plurality concluded that the government's display of
a cross at a veteran's memorial does not align the government with
Christianity or coerce or encourage Christian belief, but simply honors
and remembers the sacrifice of American soldiers fallen in defense of the
United States. 68 This alternate, purportedly secular meaning of the cross
raises at least two questions: (a) Is it independent of or parasitic upon its
rarely appeared without her Latin-cross pendant even though her behavior seemed
rather consistently unChristian.
66. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010); see also id. at 717 (suggesting
that the cross "has complex meaning beyond the expression of religious views"); id.
at 721 (concluding that the cross "is a symbol often used to honor and respect those
whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient strivings help secure an honored
place in history for this Nation .....
67. Id. at 721.
68. Id. at 716.
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ordinary Christian meaning? and (b) would its removal dishonor all
veterans?
a. Separability
The plurality in Buono ignores whether its proposed secular
meaning can be present in the absence of the Christian meaning-
whether the cross can simply convey the secular message of memory and
honor of wartime veterans without necessarily and simultaneously
signifying Christianity and the Christian resurrection. If it cannot, then
the alternate secular meaning is not independent of the ordinary Christian
meaning, and thus is not really secular.
The supposed secular meaning of the cross actually depends on
the cross's ordinary confessional meaning, and thus is not "secular" at
all. As Professor Laycock has observed,
The cross honors Christian soldiers because it
symbolizes the promise that they will rise from the
dead and live forever. To say that the cross honors
the Christian dead is not to identify a secular
meaning of the cross; it is merely to identify a
common application of the religious meaning of
the cross. [T]he Christian cross has no meaning not
69derived from its primary religious meaning.
The plurality's proposed meaning is exposed as Christian in
another way. Why choose the cross to honor all World War I veterans
when any number of unambiguously secular symbols would just as
powerfully commemorate their sacrifices? None of the Capitol Mall war
memorials and monuments, for example, seems to contain a Christian or
even a religious symbol.7° Congress's choice of an ordinarily Christian
69. Laycock, supra note 10, at 1239. See also id. at 1240 ("[The cross's]
power as a symbol, and the story it symbolizes, are entirely dependent on the
divinity of Jesus .... Unthinking Christians may intend a cross to honor all the war
dead, but that does not create any sensible theory by which the cross actually honors
nonChristians.").
70. See National Mall & Memorial Parks, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
http://www.nps.gov/nama/index.htm. Arlington National Cemetery, however,
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symbol, rather than an unambiguously and independently secular one,
suggests that the purpose and effect of displaying a Latin cross at the
memorial were precisely to align the government with Christianity.
7
'
Because the plurality's proposed secular meaning of the Sunrise
Rock cross cannot be separated from its ordinary Christian meaning-
indeed, is actually dependent upon it-it is not actually secular, and thus
cannot save the cross from invalidation under the Establishment Clause.
b. Disrespect
Though it ignored the performative effect of the government's
displaying the cross, the Buono plurality expressed deep concern about
the potential performative effect of its removal, opining that this would
dishonor and disrespect the fallen veterans whose sacrifice the cross
72supposedly memorialized. But dishonor entails the mistaken
assumption that the cross honors all veterans, whereas it really honors
contains the "Argonne Cross," erected in the early 1920s to mark the section of the
cemetery where World War I veterans were interred and named for the Argonne
Unit of the American Women's Legion. See "Argonne Cross (WWI)," ARLINGTON
NATIONAL CEMETERY
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore-the-Cemetery/Monuments-and-
Memorials/Argonne-Cross.
71. Bartrum, supra note 11, at 1661 ("[The plurality] fails to explain why-if
the cross's religious meaning is not central to its symbolism-the easiest solution
would not be to replace it with a nonreligious memorial .... [l]t seems disingenuous
... to deny that the symbol's deep religious significance adds something essential to
the mix."); see Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 689, 707-
08 (1994) (invalidating special public school district for disabled school children
drawn to coincide with boundaries of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community because,
inter alia, less religious-conscious means of accommodating community's beliefs
were available); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 618 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) ("Where the government's secular message can be conveyed by two
symbols, only one of which carries religious meaning, an observer reasonably might
infer from the fact that the government has chosen to use the religious symbol that
the government means to promote religious faith."), abrogated by Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schmepp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[W]hat our
decisions under the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religions with secular institutions which ... use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.").
72. 559 U.S. at 716.
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only Christians. Of course, neither Christian veterans nor those of any
other religious group are entitled to the military's exclusive adoption of
the sign of their faith, and thus neither Christians nor any other group can
reasonably claim disrespect when such a sign is removed.73
3. The Latin Cross in American History and Culture
The Buono plurality maintains that whatever may have been its
ordinary meaning when the cross was first erected, by the time Congress
enacted its memorial designation that meaning had evolved into a secular
commemoration of military sacrifice.
74
Culture is not static, and neither are its symbols. It is certainly
conceivable that the meaning of an unambiguously confessional symbol
might evolve into something predominantly secular, like a Christmas
tree. Originally of pagan origin and signifying renewal, Christmas trees
were adopted by early Christians as emblems of the hope of everlasting
life associated with Jesus's birth. Only recently have they reverted to
something resembling their pagan origins-largely secular signs of the
holiday season, their pervasive, inoffensive secularity confirmed byS75
ubiquitous and uncontroversial commercial exploitation.
The Latin cross has not undergone this sort of semiotic
evolution, even when displayed at a veterans' memorial or cemetery. As
Justice Alito conceded, the "thousands of small crosses" marking
battlefield graves of fallen soldiers are interspersed with hundreds of
73. Cf Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 ("[P]rohibiting the display of a creche in the
courthouse deprives Christians of the satisfaction of seeing the government adopt
their religious message as their own, but this kind of government affiliation with
particular religious messages is precisely what the Establishment Clause prohibits.");
id. at 612 ("[S]ome Christians may wish to see the government proclaim its
allegiance to Christianity in a religious celebration of Christmas, but the Constitution
does not permit the gratification of that desire .... ").
74. 559 U.S. at 716 (finding that over the decades of its existence the cross and
its commemorative purpose "ha[ve] become entwined in the public consciousness,"
making it "reasonable to interpret the congressional designation as giving
recognition to the historical meaning that the cross had attained") (alteration in
original).
75. See generally Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616; Christmas Tree, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
115737/Christmas- tree.
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76Stars of David marking the battlefield graves of fallen Jewish soldiers.
Indeed, the U.S. military now allows a choice of grave markers from
among scores of Christian, nonChristian, and nonreligious symbols. 77 If
the cross were really a secular symbol of memory and sacrifice, if it
really did "nothing more" than honor fallen veterans, it alone should
78
suffice to mark and honor the graves of all fallen servicemen.
It is not hard to imagine that Jewish veterans or their families
might feel troubled rather than honored by a Christian cross. In fact, one
of the original Buono plaintiffs, a decorated Jewish war veteran, alleged
that as "a sectarian Christian symbol," the cross "is not meaningful to
him.",79 It is equally understandable that unbelievers and most other
believers outside of the American Christian mainstream might not
80perceive a meaning in the cross that includes them. Christians were a
76. 559 U.S. at 726 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("In American military cemeteries overseas, the graves of soldiers who
perished in [the First World War] were marked with either a white cross or a white
Star of David. More than 3,500 Jewish soldiers gave their lives for the United States
in World War I.)
77. See AVAILABLE EMBLEMS OF BELIEF FOR PLACEMENT ON GOVERNMENT
HEADSTONES AND MARKERS, http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/docs/emblems.pdf. Some
of these markers are also illustrated in LESLIE GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION 422 (2d
ed. 2010).
78. Cf Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1112 & n.2 (10th Cir.
2010) (noting that the state would not have permitted the family of a fallen officer to
choose a symbol other than a Latin cross to memorialize a trooper, presumably
because the state maintained in litigation that the cross is a purely secular symbol of
honor and memory), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
79. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2002). This
plaintiff dropped out of the litigation because of questions about his Article III
standing, but the issue resurfaced at oral argument before the USSCt.
Justice Alito noted that it would have been appropriate for Congress to have
added the Star of David and other religious symbols to the monument. But he lamely
excused its failure to do so by speculating that this would not have satisfied the
cross's opponents. 559 U.S. at 726 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Of course, whether the addition of other confessional symbols would
have satisfied the plaintiffs is beside the point; the ordinary Christian meaning of the
cross does not vanish because a plaintiff acts unreasonably in settlement
negotiations.
80. See VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 53, at 8 ("As a symbol
of salvation, the cross has not lost its offensive character to those outside the
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key element in two of the sustained religious persecutions in U.S.
history, those of Mormons during the late 19th century8' and of Jehovah's
Witnesses during the early 201h century. 82 Both faiths have forcefully
rejected the cross as a confessional symbol.83 Association of the cross
with Christian persecution and discrimination is embedded in Jewish and
(especially) Muslim culture; 84 they, too, have rejected it as a confessional
symbol. 85 Unbelievers, meanwhile, remain politically and culturally
86
marginalized in the U.S., and of course have no use for the cross.
Christian tradition ... ".such as South Asians, Sunni Muslims, Jews, and
unbelievers).
81. See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION:
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
75-83, 228-33 (2002).
82. See, e.g., THE PERSECUTION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: THE RECORD OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION UNPARALLELED IN AMERICA SINCE
THE ATTACKS ON THE MORMONS (1941).
83. For Mormons, see MICHAEL G. REED, BANISHING THE CROSS: THE
EMERGENCE OF A MORMON TABOO 33-85 passim, 113-20 (2012); Gordon B.
Hinckley, The Symbol of Our Faith, THE ENSIGN (Apr. 2005), at 3 ("[F]or us, the
cross is the symbol of the dying Christ, while our message is a declaration of the
Living Christ."). In the 1960s, the LDS church obtained approval of a distinctively
Mormon military grave marker so that the burial sites of LDS servicemen and
women would not be marked by a cross. REED, supra, at 121-22.
For Jehovah's Witnesses, see Why True Christians Do Not Use the Cross in
Worship, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES,
http://www.jw.org/en/publications/books/bible-teach/why-true-christians-do-not-
use-the-cross-in-worship/; Leolaia, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Cross, JEHOVAH'S
WITNESS DISCUSSION FORUM (1990), http://www.aggelia.be/jwcross.pdf. Jehovah's
Witnesses also have their own distinctive military grave marker that lacks a cross.
84. See, e.g., T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Symbols in Public Schools: The
Islamic Headscarf and the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Sahin v.
Turkey, in ISLAM, EUROPE, AND EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 111, 112 (W. Cole
Durham, Jr., et. al. eds., 2012); see also KAREN ARMSTRONG, HOLY WAR: THE
CRUSADES AND THEIR IMPACT ON TODAY'S WORLD xvii, 2d ed. 2001); cf Awad v.
Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (striking down state constitutional
amendment approved with strong conservative Christian support that singled out
Sharia law for special disabilities).
85. E.g., WILLIAM K. EMERSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES ARMY
INSIGNIA AND UNIFORMS 268 (recounting how during World War lI, Army-
commissioned Jewish chaplains insisted on a different insignia than the cross that
had theretofore identified all Army chaplains, because they considered the cross
offensive when worn by rabbis); REED, supra note 83, at 89, 91-92 (recounting
opposition of Salt Lake City rabbis to cross memorial proposed in the early twentieth
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The ordinary meaning of the Latin cross might conceivably have
evolved over the centuries, from an exclusively Christian symbol of the
resurrection to a largely secular sign of something else, like the
Christmas tree or the crosses used to mark hospitals. 87 If this were true,
however, one would expect to find confirming cultural evidence-that is,
uses of the cross by nonChristians and unbelievers personally, as well as
collectively by institutions which nonChristians and unbelievers control
or in which they have substantial influence, to depict memory and honor
for military sacrifice, just as many unbelievers and some nonChristians
put up Christmas trees every December.
There is no cultural evidence, however, that the Latin cross has
been embraced by American unbelievers or nonChristian believers as a
religiously neutral signifier of military honor and sacrifice or, indeed, of
anything other than Christianity." The record in Buono itself confirms
this, showing that the cross at the World War I memorial was a regular
site for Easter sunrise services, but not for celebrations by nonChristians
or unbelievers or for secular ceremonies on Veterans Day, Memorial
Day, or other secular holidays with military significance.89 As plaintiff s
counsel pointed out at oral argument, there are no crosses in Jewish
cemeteries.90 Congressional designation of the cross as a veteran's
century). See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing opposition of Jewish
war veteran to Sunrise Cross).
86. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 10, at 357-75; Jennifer Gresock, Note, No
Freedom from Religion. The Marginalization of Atheists in American Society,
Politics, and Law, 1 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 569 (2001).
87. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text; supra note 74 and
accompanying and preceding text.
88. For example, every authorized military marker for a mainstream Christian
faith includes a cross, while of the 29 markers authorized for unbelievers,
nonChristians, or Christians outside the orthodox mainstream, only one includes a
cross. See AVAILABLE EMBLEMS, supra note 77; GRIFFIN, supra note 77, at 422. See
also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12, at 976 (arguing that permanent display of cross
on altar or pulpit of university chapel open to use by all faiths "cannot readily be
harmonized with nonChristian use of the space").
89. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 753 n.9 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing and summarizing record to show incorrectness of plurality's
unsupported assertion that secular memorial ceremonies were regularly held at the
cross).
90. Counsel, who is apparently Jewish, made this statement in response to
Justice Scalia's expression of outrage that one might think the cross did not honor
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memorial did not make the cross secular, it made the memorial
Christian.9'
B. Lautsi & Others v. Italy
Lautsi & Others began with two Italian parents who asked that
crucifixes displayed in classrooms of the middle school where their two
sons attended be removed.92 School and regional administrators not only
rejected their request, but also issued a circular to other public school
principals expressly recommending the crucifix's classroom display.
93
The boys' mother then filed suit in the Tribunale Administrative
Regionale Veneto, the Italian administrative court in the Veneto Region
having original jurisdiction, asking that the administrators' decision be
annulled as a violation of the fundamental Italian principle of laicita.94
Difficult to translate-it literally means "laic-ness" or
"laicity"-Italian laicitb is usually defined as "inclusive" state religious
neutrality or government "equidistance" with respect to all forms of
belief and unbelief.95 It is distinct from "secularism," which Italians
associate with French laYcit and (somewhat inaccurately) American
Jewish veterans: "The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of
Christians. I have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone
of a Jew." Tr. Oral Arg., at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (No. 08-
472).
91. See 559 U.S. at 754 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. TAR Veneto prima Sez. I, 13 novembre 2003, Sent. N. 56/04, Ric. No.
2007/02, at 2.
93. Id. at 5 2.3.1.
94. Id. at 2-3.
95. See Marco Ventura, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS:
RELIGION 17, 74 at 50 (Rik Torfs ed., 2013) (defining laiciti as a "[s]upreme
principle of Italian constitutional law ... implying the equidistance and neutrality of
the State towards all religious denominations," and derivable from constitutional
principles of "equality, non-discrimination on grounds of religion, and independence
of the State from the Catholic Church"); TAR Veneto prima Sez. 111, 17 marzo 2005,
Sent. N. 1110/2005, Ric. No. 2007/02, at 23 7.1 (defining lacithi as the "a-
confessionality" of the state) (authors' translation); Corte Cost., 14 dicembre 1989,
Sent. N. 203, 4 ("The principle of laiciti ... implies not an indifference of the
State with respect to religions but a guarantee of the State for the safeguarding of
religious liberty in a regime of confessional and cultural pluralism.") (authors'
translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 9, 10.
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church-state jurisprudence. 96 The term does not appear in the Italian
Constitution; it emerged in the wake of the 1984 Villa Madam Accords
between Italy and the Holy See, which transformed Italy from a
confessional to a secular state but expressly recognized Catholicism as
part of Italy's "historical heritage., 97 Laicit6 is now well-established as a
fundamental (albeit nontextual) Italian constitutional norm limiting
government action.98
Specifically at issue in Lautsi were two Fascist-era royal decrees
previously held valid and enforceable in contemporary republican Italy. 99
One, issued in 1924, requires that every middle school "have the national
flag" and every classroom, "the symbol of the Crucifix."'' 00 The other,
issued in 1928, lists required furnishings for various public school
classrooms, including a crucifix for each elementary school classroom.' 0'
Finding that the plaintiffs case for the constitutional invalidity
of the decrees was "not manifestly unfounded," the Tribunale referred
the case in accordance with Italian procedure to the Corte Costituzionale,
the appellate court in Italy charged with ruling on the constitutionality of
statutes and laws. 102 The Corte, however, held that it lacked jurisdiction
to determine the constitutionality of administrative (as opposed to
legislative) actions, and remanded the case back to the Tribunale. 1
03
On remand, the Tribunale upheld classroom crucifix displays,
finding that the practice conformed to laicitti because the crucifix merely
96. See LORENZO ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE 101 (2012) ("[S]ecularism must
be sharply separated from neutrality. Neutrality is inclusive, [whereas] secularism is
exclusive. The Italian government is firmly committed to neutrality, but not to
secularism. In fact, neutrality means that the state should refrain from promoting
secularism which amounts to a form of proselytism .... ) (alteration in original).
97. See Pin, supra note 11, at 120-27. Professor Pin argues that initially laicita
was characterized by a "strong connection and ... collaboration" between church
and state which supported state display of Catholic symbols, and only later evolved
into a mandate of "some" church/state separation. See id. at 134-35.
98. Corte Cost., 14 dicembre 1989, Sent. N. 203, 4 & 9.
99. See Cons. Stato Sez. II, 27 aprile 1988, Sent. N. 63/88.
100. R.D., 30 aprile 1924, n. 965/24 (It.), Art. 118, cap. XII (authors'
translation) [hereinafter 1924 Decree].
101. R.D., 26 aprile 1928, n. 1297 (It.), Art. 119, tab. C [hereinafter 1928
Decree].
102. TAR Veneto prima Sez. 1, 13 novembre 2003, Sent. N. 56/04, Ric. No.
2007/02, at 13-15 5.3 & 6 (authors' translation).
103. Corte Cost., 13 dicembre 2004, Ordinanza n. 389.
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signifies (i) the Christian origins of secular values recited in the Italian
Constitution, 0 4 and (ii) the Catholic roots of Italian history and
culture. 0 5 The Consiglio di Stato affirmed, relying only on the
• 106
Tribunale's first rationale. On plaintiffs appeal to the ECtHR, the
court's seven-judge Second Section unanimously reversed, finding that
the predominantly Catholic meaning of the crucifix infringed student and
parental rights to freedom from Catholicism and upset religious
pluralism in the classroom by suggesting that "the State takes the side of
Catholicism"'107 in violation of the European Convention of HumanR.-108
Rights. The Second Section decision, in turn, was reversed by a
seventeen-judge Grand Chamber of the ECtHR,'0 9 which found that
perpetuating a tradition of displaying crucifixes in classrooms as
"passive" symbols of culture and religious freedom was within the
"margin of appreciation" granted to Convention signatories to adapt its
principles to their particular national circumstances. ' 0
1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Crucifix
In contrast to the unadorned Latin cross, the crucifix depicts
Jesus nailed to the cross. The crucifix emerged as a Christian symbol
during the fourth or early fifth century."' Early crucifixes generally
showed a fully-clothed and triumphal Jesus "alive and reigning" on the
104. TAR Veneto prima Sez. Ill, 17 marzo 2005, Sent. N. 1110/2005, Ric. No.
2007/02, at 31-35 11.1-11.9; Lautsi- English Translations, supra note 5, at 12-
14.
105. E.g., TAR Veneto prima Sez. 111, 17 marzo 2005, Sent. N. 1110/2005,
Ric. No. 2007/02, at 28--29, 8.1-8.3; Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5,
at 11.
106. Cons. Stato, 13 gennaio 2006, Decisione N. 556/06, N. 7314/2005 Reg.
Dec. 16; Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 22-23.
107. Lautsi, at 12-13 51-55.
108. See European Convention, supra note 2, art. 9; Protocol No. 1, supra note
2, art. 2.
109. "Grand Chamber" review of a Chamber decision of the ECtHR is
analogous to en banc review of a panel decision in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. For a
description of ECtHR procedures relating to section panel and grand chamber
proceedings, see Witte & Arold, supra note 11, at 15-16.
110. Lautsi & Others, at 27-31 63-77.
111. BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 38; POCKNEE, supra note 53, at 38-39;
"Archaeology of the Cross and Crucifix," supra note 54, at 17-19.
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112
cross. It was not until the early Middle Ages that Christ was shown
dead on the cross, 113 and not until the late Middle Ages did crucifixes
generally depict a realistically crucified Jesus-almost naked and
bloodily nailed to the cross, with bowed head and eyes closed in mortal
suffering and death.' 
1 4
The crucifix is closely associated with the Roman Catholic
Church, though it is also used by Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
Reformation Protestants (especially Calvinists) rejected use of the
crucifix as an aspect of the Catholic veneration of icons, but its use
persisted among Anglicans, Lutherans, and Methodists into the
seventeenth century." 5 Since the nineteenth century, its use has been
almost entirely confined to Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, and it is
widely understood as the quintessential Roman Catholic sign." 6
112. BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 39; HARRIES, supra note 53, at 10-11, 18-
19; see VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 55, at 62-69.
113. HARRIES, supra note 53, at 28-30 (mid-seventh century); VILADESAU,
BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 53, at 48 (mid-ninth century).
114. BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 39; HARRIES, supra note 53, at 48, 65-66;
POCKNEE, supra note 53, at 48, 63, 65-66; "Archaeology of the Cross and Crucifix,"
supra note 54, at 20-21; VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 53, at 155-
58; see also RICHARD VILADESAU, THE TRIUMPH OF THE CROSS: THE PASSION OF
CHRIST IN THEOLOGY AND THE ARTS, FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE COUNTER-
REFORMATION 12-13 (2008) [hereinafter VILADESAU, TRIUMPH OF THE CROSS]
(discussing Fra Angelico's "St. Dominic in Adoration before the Crucifix" (ca.
1440-45)).
115. BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 38; POCKNEE, supra note 53, at 76-77,
VILADESAU, TRIUMPH OF THE CROSS, supra note 114, at 128-33.
116. See, e.g., J. HOPPENOT, LE CRUCIFIX 6 (De Brouwer, 5th ed. 1905).
The crucifix is the epitome of Catholic dogma: the person of
him who suffers on it, the only Son of God the Father,
conceived in Mary's womb by power of the Holy Spirit,
reminds us of the two great mysteries of the Trinity and the
Incarnation. . . . The crucifix is the memorial to Christian
morality. Pagan morality said, "Let us eat and drink, for
tomorrow we die." Against these facile principles, the cross
tells you, "You are of Christ, crucify your flesh with its vices
and sins.
Id. (emphasis in original) (authors' translation); see also Gunn, supra note 79, at 112
("The Catholic Church . . . places the crucifix at the focal point of its churches. The
sacred Mass, which employs crucifixes as part of the ceremony, commemorates the
crucifixion of Christ.").
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The ECtHR Grand Chamber barely admitted the ordinary
Catholic meaning of the crucifix. The Court laconically described the
crucifix as "above all a religious symbol" which "undoubtedly refers to
Christianity. ' 1 7 The Consiglio di Stato did little better, conceding that
"the crucifix is properly and exclusively a 'religious symbol,' insofar as
it seeks to encourage a reverent adherence towards the founder of the
Christian religion," but only in a "place of worship," foreshadowing the
ECtHR's questionable use of performative effect to empty the crucifix of
any confessional meaning at all." 8 The Tribunale evaded the problem
entirely by flatly equating the Catholic crucifix with the Christian
119
cross.
One must consult lower court decisions that were vacated or
overruled for a detailed account of the crucifix's ordinary Catholic
meaning. The Tribunale that first referred the action to the Corte
Costituzionale had no trouble conceding that the crucifix is obviously
and ordinarily understood throughout Italy as the quintessential sign of
Catholicism and Catholic belief, observing that its classroom display
"honors an unambiguous confessional meaning, perceived as such by the
largest part of those associated with the school .... ,,120 Likewise, the
Second Section of the ECtHR found that the crucifix's Catholic meaning
predominated over all others,' 2 1 and expressed its skepticism that
"display in state-school classrooms of a symbol that it is reasonable to
associate with Catholicism (the majority religion of Italy)" would serve
the religious educational pluralism and liberal-democratic values
guaranteed by the Convention. 22
There is little doubt that in Italy the crucifix, without more, is
ordinarily understood as the sign of the Catholic Church and Catholic
belief.
117. Lautsi & Others, at 27-28 66.
118. Cons. Stato, 13 gennaio 2006, Decisione N. 556/06, N. 7314/2005 Reg.
Dec. 15 (authors' translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 22; see
infra Part 11.B.2.
119. TAR Veneto prima Sez. III, 17 marzo 2005, Sent. N. 1110/2005, Ric. N.
2007./02, 13-14 (authors' translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5,
at 4-5.
120. TAR Veneto prima Sez. I, 13 novembre 2003, Sent. N. 56/04, Ric. No.
2007/02 12 (emphasis added) (authors' translation).
121. Lautsi, at 12 51, 53 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 13 56.
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2. Alternate Secular Meaning in Public School Classroom
Given the Catholic ordinary meaning of the crucifix, its display
by government seems to align it with Roman Catholicism. As with the
Latin cross, this expected effect might be displaced by another effect that
renders the crucifix secular or otherwise appropriate when placed in the
requisite physical context.
The controlling opinions in Lautsi present a semiotic regression
on this point, in which a detailed account of the crucifix's purportedly
secular performative effect is successively diluted until it drops out of the
case entirely. The Tribunale gave a rich (if controversial) account of the
crucifix's purported secular effects, concluding that it signified the
Christian foundation of secular Italian culture and universal human
rights. 13 On appeal, the Consiglio agreed in part, holding that classroom
24
crucifixes communicated the Catholic origins of secular human liberty.
Finally, the Grand Chamber found the crucifix's ordinary Catholic
meaning wholly displaced without identifying any alternate secular
meaning, holding that the crucifix is an "essentially passive" symbol that
does not religiously influence school children in the absence of1 . l25
affirmative efforts by the school to coerce Catholic practice or belief.
a. Secular Liberty & Secular History
The Tribunale began by observing that "in the public schools in
which children are necessarily introduced to the values of liberty,
democracy, and the laiciti of the State, it is not legal to impose any type
of religious belief . .,126 and emphasizing the powerful obligation of
religious impartiality that laicith imposes on the State.
127
Laicit6's constitutional mandates of state theological
equidistance and nonconfessionalism imposed on the Tribunale the
difficult task of delivering a plausible account of the crucifix as a secular
123. See infra Part l.B.2.a.
124. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
125. See infra Part Il.B.2.c.
126. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, Il1, at 24
7.1 (authors' translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 9.
127. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, 111, at 24-
25, 26 7.2, 7.4; Lautsi -English Translations, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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rather than (merely) Catholic symbol. The Tribunale began by
emphasizing that the crucifix is "also an historical-cultural symbol, and
thus endowed with a value of identity in reference to [the Italian]
people. , 12' But neither historical analysis nor even the constitutional
value of laicitti, observed the Tribunale, can change an Italian past
saturated with Christianity.' 29 An understanding of the crucifix as a mere
symbol of Italian history and culture, it concluded, would be sufficient to
dismiss the plaintiffs action, because a sign that "summarizes relevant
aspects of our society, of our humanistic culture as well as our popular
conscience, would not damage in any way the laicitth of the State or the
objectives of public school instruction and thus the sphere of liberty of
every citizen."'
30
The problem, admitted the Tribunale, is that the crucifix cannot
plausibly be viewed as merely a historical-cultural symbol, but must also
satisfy laicitti as the confessional symbol it is ordinarily understood to
be. 13 Having candidly confessed the semiotic difficulty of separating the
crucifix's ordinary confessional from its purportedly secular meaning-
something the Buono plurality failed to do-the Tribunale then (rather
less candidly) pulled a rhetorical "bait and switch." Having to this point
discussed the meaning of the "crucifix," the court inexplicably changed
to a discussion of the meaning of the "cross," as if one were indistinct
from the other.
32
128. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, 111, at 28
8.1 (authors' translation) (emphasis in original); Lautsi- English Translations,
supra note 5, at 11.
129. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, 111, at 28
8.1; Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 11.
130. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, II1, at 29
8.3 (authors' translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 11.
131. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, 111, at 29-
30 7 9.1; Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 12.
132. The court relied on the fact that individual schools had sometimes
displayed unadorned crosses in response to the Fascist-era decrees requiring display
of the crucifix. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, at
13-14 4.1-4.2; Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 4-5. As another
Fascist-era decree made clear, however, the substitution of cross for crucifix was not
a general dispensation, but a specific concession to the Waldensians ( Valdesi), a
small pre-Reformation Christian sect which rejected the crucifix and in the 1920s
was almost entirely concentrated in remote areas of Sicily and the French-Italian
Alps. See TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, 111, at 4.2
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The switch to cross from crucifix made it easier to conform its
use by government with laiciti. The unadorned cross is "understood as
the symbol of Christianity, not simply that of Catholicism, and thus also
captures beyond Catholicism itself the values of the other Christian
confessions present" in Italy,' 33 a claim that could not have been made
for the crucifix. But even granting the ecumenical character of the cross,
it does not reach non-Christian confessions, is not ordinarily secular, and
is not relevant to any secular meaning of the crucifix.
Having equated crucifix with cross, the Tribunale initiated a
detailed explication of Christianity as the root of human virtue and, in
particular, those virtues grounding universal human rights. 134 The words
"crucifix" and "cross" both appear in this lengthy passage, but the court
uses "cross" whenever it emphasizes the purportedly open and inclusive
character of Christianity. 35 The point was to establish that the cross and
the crucifix symbolize Christian charity and care for the other, values
that also ground the post-confessional Italian republic:
Christianity, . . . with its strong accent on the
precept of love for one's neighbor and even more
with the explicit predominance of charity in one's
faith, contains in essence those ideas of tolerance,
equality, and liberty that are at the base of the
modem secular state, and the Italian state m
particular.
Looking beyond the superficial, one
discerns a line of thought that gathers in itself the
Christian revolution of two thousand years ago, the
affirmation in Europe of habeas corpus, the very
cardinal elements of Enlightenment (even though
historically posed in lively contrast with religion),
(citing Circolare n. 8823 (Ministero Pubb. Instru. 1923)); Lautsi - English
Translations, supra note 5, at 5.
133. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, 111, at 30
9.2 (authors' translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 12.
134. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, 11I, at 31-
42 TT 11.1-15.2; Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 12-17.
135. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, lI, at 31-
42 TT 11.1-15.2; Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 12-17.
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that is, the liberty and dignity of man, the
declaration of the rights of man, and ultimately the
very laicitb of the modem state; all of these
historical phenomena are in a significant way-
though certainly not exclusively-in the Christian
conception of the world.' 
36
The court even went so far as to positively associate Christianity
with the motto of the profoundly anti-clerical French revolution. 1
37
From this premise, the Court concludes that laicita is so well
established as a constitutional principle that there is little danger in the
court's entertaining a "new and contemporary" secular meaning for the
cross, notwithstanding its ordinary Christian one. 38 It then takes this new
secular meaning of the Christian cross and imputes it to the Catholic
crucifix, as both
the symbol of a particular historical and cultural
national identity" and "the expression of secular
principles of the community... the crucifix can be
legitimately placed in the classrooms of public
schools, in that it not only doesn't clash with but
indeed affirms and confirms the principle of the
laicitt of the republican State.'
39
136. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, at 31-
32 11.1 (authors' translation); Lautsi- English Translations, supra note 5, at 12-
13.
137. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, I1, at 32
11.2 (.'[L]ibert , egalit, ftaternitM,' constitutes a motto easily shared by a
Christian, albeit with obvious emphasis on the third term.") (author's translation);
Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 13.
138. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, at 41-
42 15.2 (authors' translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 17.
139. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, at 42
16.2 (authors' translation) (emphasis added); Lautsi - English Translations, supra
note 5, at 18.
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Thus, the Tribunale concluded: "The crucifix is the symbol of
our history and our culture and, as a consequence, of our identity... and
also of the laicitti of the State."'4 °
The Tribunale decision is an unsubtle sleight-of-hand. It
dubiously asserted an identity of meaning between the Christian cross
and the Catholic crucifix. It then identified Christian values symbolized
by the cross, and asserted (again dubiously) that these also form the
exclusive basis of Italian constitutional and fundamental secular human
rights.' 4 1 Concluding that government display of the cross does not
violate laiciti, it simply substituted Catholic crucifix for Christian cross
to hold that display of the crucifix conforms to laiciti as well,
notwithstanding its ordinary Catholic meaning.
b. Secular Liberty
On appeal from the Tribunale, the Consiglio di Stato reasoned
that while the crucifix was undoubtedly a religious symbol when
displayed in a place of worship, it might also communicate secular
values when displayed in a nonreligious venue like a public school:
[F]or believers and nonbelievers the [crucifix's]
display will be justified and will assume a
nondiscriminatory meaning under its religious
profile, if it is able to represent and to precisely
recall in an immediately perceptible and intuitive
form... relevant civic values, and to call particular
attention to those values that suggest and inspire
our constitutional order, the base of our shared civil
life. In this sense the crucifix can develop, even in
140. TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, II, at 38
12.4 (authors' translation) (emphasis added); Lautsi - English Translations, supra
note 5, at 15.
141. As Professor Mancini has pointed out, many of the personal rights and
liberties listed in the Italian Constitution were supported by the secular left, which
obviously did not ground its support in the supposed origins of such rights in
Christian or Catholic theology. See Mancini, supra note 2, at 187. Indeed, this line of
reasoning seems to presuppose that there can be no ethic of human rights outside of
Christianity or Catholicism.
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a "secular" context different from the religious
context that is its natural home, a highly
educational symbolic function, regardless of the
religion professed by the pupils. 142
In other words, the performative effect of displaying the crucifix
in a public school classroom displaces its ordinary Catholic meaning
with an alternative secular one, namely,
the religious origin of the values of tolerance,
mutual respect, regard for the individual, the
affirmation of his or her rights and regard for his or
her liberty, freedom of conscience against
authority, human solidarity, prohibition of every
discrimination, all of which characterize the Italian
civic order.
1 43
How and why the crucifix does this is unexplained, though the
Consiglio is obviously indebted to the Tribunale's comparable analysis.
The Consiglio suggests that there is no other symbol "in Italian
culture . . . better suited" to encapsulate these secular values "than the
crucifix,,, 144 and then defers to the Veneto Ministry's judgment that the
crucifix is the most effective means of teaching Italian civic virtue. 145
This argument implicitly concedes that the ordinary Catholic
meaning of the crucifix is out of place in a public school. Accordingly,
its display there must necessarily signify something else, something
nonconfessional-like Italian constitutional and civic values-as if it
were inconceivable that Italian public school authorities might violate the
religious impartiality demanded by laicit6 by posting an obviously
confessional symbol. In the view of the Consiglio, display of the crucifix
142. Cons. Stato, sez. sesta, 13 gennaio 2006, n. 556, at 16 (authors'
translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 22.
143. Cons. Stato, sez. sesta, 13 gennaio 2006, n. 556, at 16 (authors'
translation); Lautsi -English Translations, supra note 5, at 22.
144. Cons. Stato, sez. sesta, 13 gennaio 2006, n. 556, at 17 (authors'
translation); Lautsi -English Translations, supra note 5, at 23.
145. Cons. Stato, sez. sesta, 13 gennaio 2006, n. 556, at 18 (authors'
translation); Lautsi - English Translations, supra note 5, at 23.
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in a public school necessarily displaces its ordinary Catholic meaning
with the alternate, secular meaning of Italian civic unity, though it leaves
unexplained why this must be the case.
c. (Almost) No Effect
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR largely adopted the position
of the Italian government that the "mere presence" of a "passive symbol"
like the crucifix could not violate the Convention without proof that
children were coerced or pressured or the teaching atmosphere otherwise
lacked the religious impartiality. 146 Unlike the Italian government,
however, which attributed various secular meanings to the crucifix, 147 the
ECtHR decided the case without adopting any alternate meaning at all in
place of the majoritarian Catholic significance it grudgingly admitted at
the outset. 14 8 Conceding that classroom posting of crucifixes "confer[s]
on [Italy]'s majority religion preponderant visibility in the school
environment," the court nevertheless agreed with the government that as
''an essentially passive symbol" the crucifix "cannot be deemed to have
an influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or
participation in religious activities,"" 9  especially given lack of
146. Lautsi & Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), no. 30814/06, 29-30
(Grand Chamber). Italy's submission on this point was based on a study prepared by
Professor Carlo Cardia, who later published it as a monograph. See CARDIA, supra
note 11. Cardia is professor of ecclesiastical and canon law at the Universita di
Roma III, and a prominent figure in Italian academics and legal practice relating to
law and religion. Professor Cardia was retained by the Italian Chamber of Deputies
in connection with the lengthy negotiations between the Italian government and the
Holy See that yielded the Villa Madama Accords that formally altered Italy from a
Catholic confessional to a religiously impartial state. See generally infra notes 221-
23 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., CARDIA, supra note 11.
148. Lautsi & Others, at 27-28 66.
149. Id. at 29 72. Based on a review of United States Establishment Clause
decisions, Claudia Haupt has cogently argued that government display of visual
religious symbols is no less problematic than its use of religious texts, and that
finding a religious symbol constitutionally acceptable because it is "merely passive"
overlooks that the government's display of such symbols often violates the
Establishment Clause by coercing viewers to violate their personal beliefs or by
communicating strong government endorsement of religion. See generally Haupt,
Active Symbols, supra note 6.
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"compulsory teaching about Christianity" or other evidence that "the
authorities were intolerant of pupils who believed in other religions, were
non-believers or who held non-religious philosophical convictions."
0
The ECtHR reasoned that the physical context of the public
school classroom in which the crucifix is displayed neutralized its
ordinary Catholic meaning even in the absence of an alternate secular
meaning. Its decision constitutes an implicit judgment that the
purportedly open, religiously neutral, and plural environment of Italian
public schools diluted the ordinary Catholic meaning it would otherwise
communicate to the point that it was apparently undetectable.
This contrasts with the ECtHR's Second Section opinion, which
held that the Convention requires government "to refrain from imposing
beliefs, even indirectly, in places where persons are dependent on
[government] or in places where they [are] particularly vulnerable," such
as elementary and middle schools.151 It seems a matter of common sense
that "in countries where the great majority of the population owe
allegiance to one particular religion the manifestation of the observances
and symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner,
may constitute pressure on students who do not practice that religion or
those who adhere to another religion.",52 The record showed that "it is
impossible not to notice crucifixes in the classrooms," and that the Italian
government considers them "an integral part of the school
environment."'' 53 The Second Section therefore concluded that the
ordinary Catholic meaning of the crucifix served to align the government
with Catholicism:
The presence of the crucifix may easily be
interpreted by pupils of all ages as a religious sign,
and they will feel that they have been brought up in
a school environment marked by a particular
150. Lautsi & Others, at 30 74; see also id. ("In addition, the applicants did
not assert that the presence of the crucifix in classrooms had encouraged the
development of teaching practices with a proselytizing tendency, or claim that the
[applicant children] had ever experienced a tendentious reference to that presence by
a teacher in the exercise of his or her functions.").
151. Id. at 11 49.
152. Id. at 12 50 (citation omitted).
153. Id. at 12 54.
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religion. What may be encouraging for some
religious pupils may be emotionally disturbing for
pupils of other religions or those who profess no
religion. That risk is particularly strong among
pupils belonging to religious minorities. Negative
freedom of religion is not restricted to the absence
of religious services or religious education. It
extends to practices and symbols expressing, in
particular or in general, a belief, a religion or
atheism. That negative right deserves special
protection if it is the State which expresses a belief
and dissenters are placed in a situation from which
they cannot extract themselves if not by making
disproportionate efforts and acts of sacrifice.
154
By contrast, the Grand Chamber gave outsized importance to the
margin of appreciation doctrine. Deferring to the Italian government by
use of this doctrine theoretically implies that there is a nationally
accepted secular understanding of the crucifix rooted in Italian history
and culture. As we shall see, however, there is no authentic Italian
narrative in which the crucifix functions as a secular historical-cultural
symbol embraced by unbelievers and non-Catholics. 155
In sum, the Grand Chamber opinion simply and implausibly
denies that display of the crucifix has any meaning or effect at all, its
being just a "passive" symbol.
3. The Crucifix in Italian History and Culture
Like Buono, Lautsi involves assertions about Italian history and
culture that underwrite the defense of the classroom crucifix displays: the
ordinary Catholic meaning of the crucifix is displaced by alternate
secular meanings (as the Italian courts held) or is displaced by the secular
classroom context even if no alternate secular meaning takes its place (as
held by the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber).
Accordingly, one should be able to look for confirming evidence in
154. Id. at 12-13 55.
155. See infra Parts II.B.3, IIl.
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Italian history and culture of the proposed alternative secular meanings
and effects of the crucifix (or the absence of confessional meaning and
effect).
Italy has experienced wide swings and violent alterations in its
forms of government and their relationship to the Papacy and the Church
since just the mid-nineteenth century. This complex history can only be
sketched here. We emphasize as well that our purpose is not to make
normative judgments, but rather to test whether the claimed secular
meanings and effects (or absent confessional meaning and effect) cohere
with Italian history and culture.
a. Papal Absolutism
From the eighth through most of the nineteenth century, with
some interruption, a swath of central Italy was ruled by the Pope as an
absolute temporal monarch. 156 Beyond these Papal or Pontifical States,
the Pope sought to impose his will on the feudal kingdoms of Europe
even in what today we would call "secular" matters,'57 claiming the
power to depose kings and emperors by his power of
excommunication. 58
156. See MARIO ASCHERI, THE LAWS OF LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY (1000-1500):
FOUNDATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEM 222, 276, 350 (2013); RtMI
BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 130-40
(Lydia G. Cochran trans., 2007); HARRY HEARDER, ITALY: A SHORT HISTORY 43-59
(Jonathan Morris ed. 2001).
Though formally absolute, the power of the Papacy over the States was often
compromised by that of the Holy Roman Emperor and other feudal rulers, as well as
the local nobility and generally endemic corruption. See ASCHERI, supra note 156, at
312-14; LUIGI BARZINI, THE ITALIANS 162, 302-05 (1977); HAROLD BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION 90-91 (1983). As Galileo discovered, however, papal power was
real enough to impose the Inquisition in the Papal States and the rest of Italy. See
ASCHERI, supra note 156, at 278, 287-88; BARZINI, supra, at 314.
157. No meaningful distinction between "religious" and "secular" existed
during the Middle Ages or the medieval and early modem periods; the Church and
the State each exercised power in both realms. See, e.g., BRAGUE, supra note 156, at
136; Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzmann, Against Religious Institutionalism,
99 VA. L. REV. 917, 928 (2013).
158. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 156, at 87, 94-98; Schragger &
Schwartzman, supra note 157, at 928.
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Both the crucifix and the Latin cross signified the temporal and
spiritual power of Christianity and the Church throughout medieval
Europe.15 9 In the Papal States, the crucifix was ubiquitous in government
venues and many commercial and private ones.
b. Opposition to Constitutional Government
Most of the Papal States fell to the armies of the Italian
unification movement in 1861, which then proclaimed the Kingdom of
Italy, a liberal, anti-clerical, constitutional monarchy governing most of• 160
the Italian peninsula. Rome and its environs remained under papal
control until 1870, when the new monarchy occupied and annexed Rome
and confined the Pope to the tiny enclave of Vatican City, opening a
schism with the Church that lasted nearly sixty years.161
The practical independence and political freedom of action
afforded the Papacy by the Papal States vanished with its loss of Rome
and the rest of the States.' 62 The Church's consequent exclusion from
governing power in any part of Italy also undermined its ability to
regulate the practice of Catholicism in its historical, cultural, and
geographical homeland. 161
The annexation of Rome in 1870 unified Italy politically but not
socially or culturally. 64 Outside of the Papal States, the Italian peninsula
had consisted for centuries of shifting and diverse kingdoms, duchies,
republics, city-states, and enclaves periodically occupied or controlled by
159. See PETER BROWN, THE RISE OF WESTERN CHRISTIANITY: TRIUMPH AND
DIVERSITY, a.d. 200-1000, at 72, 391 (2 d ed. 2003); CARL ERDMANN, THE ORIGIN OF
THE IDEA OF CRUSADE 35, 39, 135,200,226, 345-48 (Marshall W. Baldwin & Walter
Goffart trans. 1977); cf MALCOLM BARBER, THE NEW KNIGHTHOOD 66 (2012)
(observing that medieval popes granted the Knights Templar the right to display
the red cross on their tunics as a symbol of "their willingness to
suffer martyrdom in the defence of the Holy Land.").
160. See HEARDER, supra note 156, at 187-97, 202-03.
161. See R.J.B. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI 236 (2002) [hereinafter BOSWORTH,
MUSSOLINI]; HEARDER, supra note 156, at 187-97, 203-04; SERGIO ROMANO,
LIBERA CHIESA, LIBERO STATO? 15 (2005).
162. See ROMANO, supra note 161, at 30; Ventura, supra note 89, 3, at 24.
163. See ROMANO, supra note 161, at 46.
164. Alessandro Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy: A "Mission Impossible"?, 41
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 839, 841-42 (2010) [hereinafter A. Ferrari, Civil Religion
in Italy]; see HEARDER, supra note 156, at 165.
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foreign powers."' In short, the people of the new Italian state had little in
common other than Roman Catholicism.
Pope Pius IX, however, moved quickly to prevent Catholicism
from being used to unify the peoples of Italy. Aiming at the restoration of
the Papal States (especially Rome), 166 and deeply suspicious of liberal,
constitutional, and other modernist values, 16 he issued the non expedit,
which declared it "not expedient" for Catholics to participate in the
political life of the new state by voting, holding office, participating in its
functions, or otherwise recognizing its legitimacy.16 Enforced by the
Pope's power of excommunication,169 the non expedit was a powerful
obstacle to effective government in the early years of the monarchy,
especially in the South, splitting the Kingdom into pro- and anti-Catholic
factions and foreclosing any possibility that Catholicism might act as a
unifying national force.
170
165. See e.g., BARZINI, supra note 156, at 352ff (depicting maps showing the
multitude of shifting civil-political jurisdictions on the peninsula between 1500 and
1810); HEARDER, supra note 156, at 42, 86, 137, 156, 159, 195 (same between 600
and 1870).
166. Pius IX is reported to have exclaimed, "Rome is mine[!]," whenever the
Kingdom of Italy was mentioned in his presence. R.J.B. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S
ITALY: LIFE UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP 258 (2006) [hereinafter BOSWORTH,
MUSSOLINI'S ITALY].
167. See, e.g., FRANCESCO BARBAGALLO, L'ITALIA REPUBBLICANA 15 (2009).
In 1864, Pius published the controversial Syllabus listing the many "grave errors" of
modernism, including legalization of divorce, abolition of temporal papal authority,
state recognition of religions other than Catholicism, elimination of Catholicism as
the only state religion, freedom of religious exercise for non-Catholics, separation of
church and state, freedom of thought and opinion, and the idea of progress. See
ALESSANDRO FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA IN ITALIA: UN PERCORSO INCOMPIUTO
17 (2012) [hereinafter A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA]; Zachary R. Calo,
Catholicism, Liberalism, and Human Rights, J. CHRISTIAN LEG. THEORY 7-8 (2011),
available at http://www.clsnet.org/document.doc?id=273.
168. HEARDER, supra note 156, at 203; ROMANO, supra note 161, at 17; see
also Ventura, supra note 95 36, at 34 ("Pius LX rejected any compromise implying
the end of the temporal power of the Holy See and the recognition of the Kingdom
of Italy....").
169. ROMANO, supra note 161, at 21-22; Ventura, supra note 95, 36, at 34-
35.
170. See BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 15; see also
BARZINI, supra note 156, at 335 ("The Kingdom was undermined by the alliance of
the popular classes with the Church, the incredulity of the majority of its citizens,
and the national character.").
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Nevertheless, the Kingdom of Italy succeeded in introducing
substantial religious liberty and in liberalizing the law of church and
state, despite its formally confessional character and the determined
opposition of the Church.IV1 Its policy was captured in Camillo Cavour's
phrase, "[a] free Church in a free State." 172 These were accompanied,
however, by widespread suppression of Catholic orders and institutions
and expropriation of their property. 173 Speaking of the Kingdom of Italy
after unification, Professor Ventura observed that "liberalism was its
political source of inspiration, secularized (often anti-clerical) bourgeois
society was its social reference, and policies limiting the influence of the
Catholic Church and expanding the powers of the State in areas
traditionally reserved to the Church were its natural implication."'
74
c. Alignment with Fascism
Benito Mussolini established a Fascist dictatorship in the early
1920s, though he retained the monarchy as part of the formal
constitutional apparatus.175 Italian Fascist ideology was profoundly anti-
clerical and had even less use for Catholicism than the liberal ideology it
176 177displaced. Having come to power by a threatened coup, however,
Mussolini's government had a legitimacy problem, which he proposed to
solve by courting the support of the Church.178 The Fascist government
171. See A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 164, at 843; Pin, supra
note 11, at 111 n.103; Ventura, supra note 95, 39, 42, at 36-37.
172. See ROMANO, supra note 161, at 73 (authors' translation).
173. See Ventura, supra note 95, 44, at 38.
174. Ventura, supra note 95, 36, at 34.
175. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 180-83; HEARDER,
supra note 156, at 225-29.
176. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 176, 257, 259;
Ventura, supra note 95, 47, at 40. Nevertheless, there was a significant Catholic
presence in Italian Fascism from the beginning. See ROMANO, supra note 161, at 47.
177. Italy officially entered the Fascist era on October 30, 1922, when King
Vittorio Emanuelle III was intimidated into asking Mussolini to form a government
after the latter's "March on Rome" with an armed Fascist militia. BOSWORTH,
MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 181-82.
178. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 176, 257; see
ROMANO, supra note 161, at 70 ("Mussolini was a 'Catholic of convenience,'
protecting the Church for the 'value added' it conferred on his politics in Italy and
the world.") (authors' translation).
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began to rebuild the Church/State relationship that had fractured with
unification and the annexation of Rome, 179 including unilateral issuance
of the crucifix decrees at issue in Lautsi,180 and otherwise signaled that it
was open to reconciling the Italian state with the Church. The Pope, for
his part, had still not fully accepted the Italian state,' 81 but by then had
also decided that liberalism, socialism, and communism were bigger
threats than Fascism. 182
Negotiations eventually yielded the "Lateran Pacts," a "treaty"
between the Kingdom of Italy and the Church named for the Vatican
palace in which they were executed. They expressly provided for
recognition of the Papacy as a tiny but sovereign entity demarcated by
the borders of Vatican City, and formally declared Roman Catholicism
the sole state religion of Italy, with accompanying powers and privileges
including tax exemption and compulsory teaching of Catholicism in
public schools. 183 The Church also received an enormous sum as
reparations for its loss of Rome and the Papal States, as well as
continuing financial support for its "social welfare" ministries. In return,
the Church officially recognized the Kingdom of Italy and thus, by
unmistakable implication, the legitimacy of Mussolini's dictatorial
government.
84
Mussolini and the Church both got what they wanted. 185 Italy's
treaty with the Church legitimized Mussolini and Fascism at home and
179. See A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 33-34;
Ventura, supra note 95, 47, at 39-40.
180. See A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 33-40; supra
notes 161-170 and accompanying text.
181. See ROMANO, supra note 161, at 49.
182. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 259, 374; ROMANO,
supra note 161, at 33, 37-38, 68; Ventura, supra note 95, 52, at 41 ("[F]ascists and
most Catholics shar[ed] the same loathing not just for socialism and communism,
but also for the enlightenment, democracy and liberalism, all deemed foreign ideas
not belonging to the Italian Catholic tradition. The Fascist cult for order and
discipline, authority and hierarchy, also did not displease a Church still obdurately
opposed to pluralism, democracy, and civil liberties.").
183. HEARDER, supra note 156, at 230; ROMANO, supra note 161, at 74.
184. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 257; HEARDER, supra
note 156, at 230; ROMANO, supra note 161, at 74-75.
185. See A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 29; ROMANO,
supra note 161, at 145.
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abroad and enabled consolidation of their already considerable power.86
For the Church, the Lateran Pacts undid the liberal reforms protecting
institutional and individual religious liberty, reconfessionalizing Italy as
an exclusively Catholic state and subjecting non-Catholic religions to
discriminatory burdens,' 87 while also initiating a de facto alliance with
Fascism that lasted from 1929 through at least the fall of Mussolini's first
government in 1943.' The pope who negotiated the Pacts, Pius XI
(1922-39), welcomed Fascism as an ally in the Church's fight against
democracy, liberalism, pluralism, socialism, and communism.'
89
186. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 238-39.
187. A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 29-32.
188. See, e.g., BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 231
(concluding that the Pacts marked "the embrace of Fascist totalitarianism by the
public forms of Catholicism," and characterizing the Church's relation to the Fascist
regime as a kind of "wedlock" or "cohabitation"); id. at 238 (describing Mussolini's
brother's "highest delight" at the thought of an Italian people who could now
reconcile their everyday inspiration from Catholicism with their nation state. The
papal paper, L'Osservatore Romano, applauded a pact whereby "Italy has been
given back to God and God to Italy." The Jesuit journal, Civilti Cattolica, in March
1929 agreed that Fascism incarnated "the restoration of a Christian society."); id. at
257 (Pius X1 disclosing to Mussolini that he prayed morning and night to the latter's
guardian angel); ROMANO, supra note 161, at 75 ("'And perhaps what was needed
was a man like the one Providence sent our way; a man who without the
preoccupations of liberal-minded men for whom all those laws, may we say, and all
those regulations were as much fetishes and, precisely as fetishes, the more
intangible and venerated, the more ugly and deformed."') (quoting Pius Xl's
description of Mussolini) (authors' translation); see also BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI,
supra note 161, at 238 (noting that for a time, Pius "favoured something which he
called 'Catholic totalitarianism').
The post-Lateran era is replete with examples of endorsements of and
expressions of sympathy for Fascism by lower-ranking Catholic clerics. ROMANO,
supra note 161, at 72; e.g., BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 239,
259, 489; ROMANO, supra note 161, at 84-85.
189. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI, supra note 161, at 258. Mussolini and Pius X1
accepted that the church and state shared enough in their views of the social and
gender order at home and in regard to Malta, the USSR and a number of other issues
abroad for accommodation to remain the best policy. Fascism, the Pope said, stood
for "order, authority, and discipline," none of them contrary to the Catholic way of
thinking. Id. Mussolini and the Church nevertheless had plenty of disagreements,
and Pius XI issued encyclicals against Fascist and Nazi excesses. See GIANNI LONG,
ALLE ORIGINI DEL PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE: IL DIBATTITO SULLA LIBERTA
RELIGIOSA NELL'ETA DELLA COSTITUENTE 212-13 (1990).
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The relationship between Fascism and the Church deepened with
the election of Pius Xl's successor, Pius XII (1939-58). Pius XII not only
shared his predecessor's view of Fascism as a bulwark against
contemporary political and social movements opposed by the Church,
190
he was more cautious about criticizing the regime and less reticent about
cooperating with it.' 91 Pius Xi's family, additionally, had close ties to
the Bank of Rome, which was a crucial source of Fascist financing.
192
As we discuss in more detail below, 193 Pius XII is a figure of
great controversy. Professor Bosworth's measured assessment of his
attitudes observes that
there has been an absurd and lengthy debate
whether or not Pius XII was 'Hitler's pope,' a
warrior who de facto served the German side of the
conflict. Of course he did not. The Church
authorities judged Nazism before and after 1939 an
ungodly movement. It is fairer, however, to see
Pius and the hierarchy over whom he presided as
190. See BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI, supra note 161, at 348-49.
[T]he elevation of Pius XII was welcomed among the Fascist
leadership, as it should have been, given the new Pope's
family background in Italian high finance, fervent anti-
communism and preference for Fascism over other modem
ideologies which kept in thrall a sinful mankind. Despite
further jars with Mussolini, in his occupation of the papal chair
Pius XII heralded no rupture in the cohabitation between
Church and State in Fascist Italy.
Id.
191. ROBERT A. VENTRESCA, SOLDIER OF CHRIST: THE LIFE OF POPE PIUS XII
66, 90, 95, 131, 150-53 (2013) (concluding that as Vatican Secretary of State,
Cardinal Pacelli had moderated strident criticisms of Fascism and Nazism that Pius
XI had been inclined to issue, and continued this tendency when he was elevated as
Pope Pius XII); see also id. at 142-43 (observing that members of Mussolini's
government were pleased with Pacelli's election as pope because they expected him
to act more favorably towards Fascism than had Pius XI, based on Pacelli's
sympathy for Franco and the Falangists, "his constructive working relationship with
Fascist Italy, and his continued pursuit of better relations with Hitler's regime ...
."1).
192. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI, supra note 161, at 237, 348.
193. See infra Part I.B.3.d.
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fellow travellers or outright sympathizers with
Mussolini and Fascism. In what they perceived as
this wicked world, the Vatican liked most of what
they saw in Fascism and . . . preferred it probably
to liberal democracy and certainly to socialism and
communism. All in all, the Church's wartime
stance towards the dictatorship was not very
different from that prevailing among [Italian]
businessmen and landowners, who thought that
Fascism, despite its eccentricities, was fine for
them until it became obvious that it was going to
lose its battles on every front.
194
d Fascist-Era Anti-Semitism
It is not true, as Italians sometimes suggest,195that anti-Semitism
was largely unknown in pre-war Italy.196 Hostility to Jews is deeply
rooted in Italian and Catholic history (as it is in other religions and
elsewhere in the West). 197 Jews in the Papal States were subjected to the
Inquisition, and humiliations and disabilities imposed on them as late as
the 1 9 th century bore a disquieting resemblance to those instituted by the
Nazis in advance of the Holocaust. 198 For centuries the Church had
taught that the burdens borne by Jews in Europe were the natural and
194. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 490.
195. See, e.g., BARZ1NI, supra note 156, at 315; BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S
ITALY, supra note 166, at 419.
196. See BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 417; ROMANO,
supra note 161, at 87.
197. See, e.g., VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 53, at 108, 167
(detailing anti-Semitism in Catholic theology and art during the Middle Ages);
VILADESAU, TRIUMPH OF THE CROSS, supra note 114, at 97, 99, 146-47, 150 (same
in Catholic and Protestant theology, art, and theatre during the late medieval and
early modem eras).
198. For example, in 1516 Roman Jews were ordered by the Papacy to wear a
blue hat or scarf marking them as non-Christians, and were confined to a walled
ghetto with guarded gates. These restrictions were enforced until Rome was annexed
in 1870. See, e.g., CORRADO AUGIAS, THE SECRETS OF ROME 352-56, 359-62
(Lawrence Jenkins trans., 2007).
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deserved consequence of their having rejected the true Savior and his
New Testament.'
1 99
By the pre-war era, Catholic teaching distinguished acceptable
"discrimination" against Jews from their unacceptable "persecution."
The Church condemned anti-Jewish violence, but generally supported
discriminatory legislation that sought to restrict Jewish influence on
Catholic society, at least in Italy.2°° Having rejected the Christian
revelation, Jews were viewed as a continuing threat to properly
constituted Christian societies, and thus could be treated as second-class
citizens.201 Pre-war popes also reflexively associated Jews with
communism, liberalism, modernism, socialism, and other enemies of the
late 19'h and early 201h century Church.
2 02
Catholic teaching, however, understood Judaism as a religion203
and a culture, not as a supposed race. The Church viewed Jews who
converted to Catholicism as no longer Jewish, and it consistently
protested Fascist application of Jewish racial laws against Catholic
converts.204 Fascist-era efforts to intervene on behalf of all Jews,205
however, were rare. For example, the Church never generally
condemned Mussolini's 1938 anti-Jewish racial laws, except as they
affected Jewish converts to Catholicism and Jews married to Catholics.
20 6
Discrimination against observant Jews resonated with the Church's belief
199. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 161, at 87; VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at
9.
200. ROMANO, supra note 161, at 87; SUSAN ZUCCOTTI, UNDER His VERY
WINDOWS: THE VATICAN AND THE HOLOCAUST IN ITALY 56 (2002).
201. ROMANO, supra note 161, at 86-87.
202. See A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 35;
BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 258, 262, 374, 415; ROMANO,
supra note 161, at 86-87. Because unification eliminated ghettoization of Italian
Jews and introduced religious equality, papal anti-Semitism often overlapped with
the papacy's hostility to the Kingdom of Italy. See VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at
176; ZUCCOTTI, supra note 200, at 10, 15.
203. ZUCCOTTI, supra note 200, at 15, 22.
204. RONALD J. RYCHLAK, RIGHTEOUS GENTILES: How PIUS XII AND THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH SAVED HALF A MILLION JEWS FROM THE NAZIS 86-87 (2005);
ZUCCOTTI, supra note 200, at 50-51.
205. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
206. See Ventura, supra note 95, 61, at 44. In fairness, the 1938 laws
provoked little popular opposition among lay Italians. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S
ITALY, supra note 166, at 420.
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that the practice of Judaism subverted the Christian message and thus
. • . , 207
justified measures to reduce Jewish influence.
Whether the Fascist-era popes-Pius XI and especially Pius
XII-were unacceptably passive in the face of the Holocaust is a matter
of enormous factual and ethical controversy. Their defenders argue that
they acted courageously, doing the most that could have been done given
201the dire circumstances of the Church. Papal detractors, on the other
207. See ZuccoTr, supra note 200, at 33.
The terrible truth is that [Pius XI and Pius XII] were not
opposed to moderate measures separating Jews from Christian
society. That attitude continued throughout the war and
complicated every decision. With each week and month that
passed it became more awkward and difficult to oppose
measures that should have been denounced from the onset.
Id. at 319.
208. Professor Rychlak argues that Pius XI and Pius XII both issued
encyclicals and statements criticizing Fascism and Nazism and otherwise
condemned anti-Semitism. See, e.g., RYCHLAK, supra note 204, at 23-41 passim,
91-93, 97, 112-19, 124-28, 155; accord VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 174
(observing that Pius XII's 1942 Christmas address "alluded in general terms to those
who solely because of their nation or their race, have been condemned to death or
progressive extinction."). Once the war started, the Vatican, as a sovereign country,
was obliged to maintain its neutrality by both international law and the threat of
invasion, with the attendant threat of arrest of the Pope himself. See ROMANO, supra
note 161, at 91-92; RYCHLAK, supra note 204, at 17-18, 123-24, 133-36;
VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 166-67; ZUCCOTTI, supra note 200, at 206-07, 220,
315-16. Short of actual invasion, Fascists or Nazis could have easily laid siege to the
Vatican, cutting off food, fuel, power, and most contact with the outside world. See
ROMANO, supra note 161, at 88 (describing the threatening and isolated
circumstances of Pius XII during the Fascist era, especially after the German
occupation in 1943).
It is undeniable, finally, that courageous Catholic clerics in Italy-including the
cardinal archbishops of Genoa, Florence, Milan, and Turin, and some Vatican clerics
(perhaps including Pius himself)-ran great risks to hide and protect thousands of
Jews from arrest, internment, and deportation under the German occupation; some
paid with their lives. See, e.g., RYCHLAK, supra note 204, at 18, 101, 105; ZuccoTri,
supra note 200, at 87-88, 189-92, 199, 202-06, 212-13, 233-64 passim. These
efforts, it is suggested, were directed behind the scenes by Pius XII because he could
not openly challenge the Fascists or the Nazis. See, e.g., RYCHLAK, supra note 204,
at 7, 101-02, 130-33, 138, 255; see also VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 299, 307.
Finally, it is suggested that an apparently greater percentage of Jews survived in
Italy-substantially more than 80% of the pre-war population of about 45,000-than
anywhere else in Europe. See LONG, supra note 189, at 283; see also BOSWORTH,
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hand, contend that defenses of the Fascist-era popes are myths built on
repetition and exaggeration encouraged by the Church.2 °9
MUSSOLINI'S ITALY, supra note 166, at 472 (observing that about 7,000 Italian Jews
perished in concentration camps).
209. Pius Xl's encyclicals, for example, did not condemn Fascism or Nazism
as such or for their persecution of Jews, but only for their offenses against the
Church. See LONG, supra note 189, at 213; VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 117,
126-27, 177. As we indicated above, neither pope was fundamentally opposed to
discriminatory measures designed to safeguard Christian society against
disproportionate Jewish influence, see supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text,
and they and other Church leaders welcomed Fascism as an ally against the Church's
many 2 0th century enemies, see supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
No written evidence or first-hand account has ever emerged of a general
directive by Pius XII that Vatican officials and Catholic orders and clerics assist
Jewish fugitives during the Fascist era, even in Italy or strongly Catholic countries
where the Church enjoyed grassroots influence. See, e.g., VENTRESCA, supra note
191, at 308; ZUCCOTi, supra note 200, at 101, 114-15, 192, 180, 236, 238, 243,
245, 253, 258-59, 263-64, 281. No general public condemnation of Fascist or Nazi
anti-Semitism was ever issued, even after the possibility of Axis occupation or a
siege was eliminated by the Allied liberation of Rome (June 4, 1944) or, indeed, the
end of the war itself (May 6, 1945). VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 177, 219, 229,
310; see ZUCCOTTI, supra note 200, at 283. While some clerics courageously hid and
protected Jews during the German occupation, see supra note 208, most did not. See,
e.g., Zuccorri, supra note 200, at 201 (noting that of the 1,272 Catholic orders and
institutions and additional "hundreds of parish churches" operating in Rome during
the German occupation, only 155 are claimed by the Vatican to have sheltered
Jews); see also VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 230 (same regarding 180 Catholic
institutions). Many Italian clerics embraced even the extreme measures imposed
during the German occupation, ROMANO, supra note 161, at 93-95; ZuccoTTi,
supra note 200, at 258, 268-73, and the Vatican itself was conflicted about its own
sheltering of Jews and the appropriateness of such aid by other Italian clerics. See
ZuccoTTi, supra note 200, at 45-46, 206-10, 192, 195, 219-31, 256-58, 281-85.
Interventions by Pius XII and other Vatican officials, it is argued, were cautious,
vague, polite, and few, usually put forward on behalf of Jewish converts to
Catholicism and Jews married to Catholics, and rarely decisive in the actual rescue
of Jews. See, e.g., VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 147, 177-80, 189; ZuccoTTi,
supra note 200, at 3, 50-51, 64-69, 78, 101-46 passim, 218-19, 272-73, 292.
Professor Zuccotti praises the Vatican for eventual efforts late in the war on behalf
of Jews facing deportation from Italian occupation zones in Croatia and southeastern
France, and from Hungary. ZUCCOTri, supra note 200, at 125-26, 129-31, 293-94.
Finally, however one presents the numbers, by the end of the war Italian Jews
had been reduced to substantially less than half of their prewar population by
immigration, "defensive" conversion to Catholicism, and deportation to death
camps. See LONG, supra note 189, at 283.
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We cannot resolve these controversies here. 2  However,
whatever Pius XI and XII, the Vatican, and the Church may or may not
have done for Jews during the Fascist era, it cannot be denied that their
greatest focus was on protecting Catholic interests-aligning the Church
with Fascist Italy to obtain recognition of its temporal sovereignty,
reconfessionalize Italy, and obtain reparations for loss of the Papal
States; negotiating a concordat with the Nazi regime to protect the
Church's members and interests in Germany; tailoring its
pronouncements and actions during the war to safeguard Vatican
neutrality and forestall occupation or siege; and intervening mostly on
behalf of Jewish converts and Jews in mixed marriages rather than for
211Jews in general. When these interests conflicted with the protection of
Jews-even Italian Jews-the popes, the Vatican, and the Church
usually favored their own interests over those of the Jews, though some
210. Professor Ventura offers this nuanced assessment of Papal and Church
conduct with respect to Italian Jews during the war:
From 1938 to 1945, Italian racial laws under the alliance
between Italian fascism and German Nazis, exerted a heavy
toll on Italian Jewish communities, in particular in Rome. The
debate is still open on the responsibilities of individual
Catholics and of the Catholic Church as a whole. While
experts have exposed the heavy involvement of Italian
Catholics in the anti-Jewish persecution, the dominant
narrative in the media is that the diplomatic wariness of the
Holy See was inevitable, and that eventually Catholic
institutions proved friendly to the Jewish people.
Ventura, supra note 95, 19, at 28; see also id., 61, at 44 ("Confronted with anti-
Semitism leading to deportations to concentration camps and to the holocaust,
Catholics split: some of them did their best to protect threatened Jewish people, but
many others concurred in the persecution through omission or connivance.").
211. See ZUCCOTrI, supra note 200, at 323 (describing Vatican officials'
"narrow focus on their own Catholic constituency" during the Fascist era, and their
view that the Vatican was obliged to "concentrate its resources and energies on the
Catholic faithful, so threatened by the modem world"); VENTRESCA, supra note 191,
at 177, 178 (Pius XII "shared the conventional view that Jewish questions were not
the primary concern of the church .... [As secretary of state], the future Pius XII did
not believe he had the authority, or the responsibility, to defend the civil rights of
German Jews as vigorously as he defended German Catholics."); Ventura, supra
note 95, 61, at 44 n.86 (noting historian Giovanni Miccoli's conclusion that during
the Fascist era neither the Catholic Church nor Christian churches generally viewed
protecting Jews, even from deportation and extermination, as a pressing concern).
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Italian and Vatican clerics individually (and heroically) chose
212differently. This prioritization of the Church's interests and
constituencies when confronted with Fascism and Nazism seriously
undercuts the claim that the crucifix can be sensibly viewed as a mere
secular symbol of Italian history and culture or the constitutional
213protection of all Italians.
e. Catholic Confessional Republic
Post-war Italy chose liberal democracy in a 1946 referendum,
214
but Pius XII and the Church proved to be insurmountable obstacles to
implementation of Italy's liberal-democratic Constitution. Jews,
Protestants, and every other non-Catholic religion, along with a secular
left of social democrats, socialists, and communists, endorsed a
nonconfessional state with individual and institutional religious equality,
as was indeed provided by the text of the proposed Constitution. 2 This
would have necessitated repudiation or substantial amendment of the
Fascist-era Lateran Pacts, which privileged the Church and severely
constrained the religious liberty of non-Catholic individuals and
- 216institutions.
Non-Catholic endorsement of religious equality drew a rebuke
from Pius XII, who publicly accused Jews and Protestants of conspiring
with leftist unbelievers to deprive the Church of its rightful, preeminent
place in Italy, invoking the traditional teaching that constitutional
protection was appropriate only for religious truth, meaning the Church
217
and its teaching.
212. This is one of Zuccotti's primary claims. See, e.g., ZUCCOTTI, supra note
200, at 48-54, 69, 87-89, 189-92, 199-204, 218-20, 235-37, 244-45, 252-53,257-
61; accord VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 78-86, 92, 99-103, 146-47, 189-92, 221.
213. See, e.g., ZUCCOTTI, supra note 200, at 69 (noting that until the papacy of
John XXIII, "it was not considered self-evident that the Catholic Church should
champion the rights of those outside its fold."); see also Calo, supra note 167, at 3-4
(noting Church's transformation since mid-1 9 th century from staunch opponent to
powerful defender of liberal-democratic rights and values).
214. Ventura, supra note 95, 64, at 45.
215. See Pin, supra note 11, at 113-114. Ventura, supra note 95, 65, at 45.
216. E.g., A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171 at 44; LONG,
supra note 189, at 236, 288-89, 293-98.
217. LONG, supra note 189, at 214,217-20.
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Pius thus insisted on constitutionalization of the Pacts without
alteration, despite their flat contradiction of religious liberty and equality
guarantees in the proposed Constitution." As Professor Alessandro
Ferrari has observed, the Church again, as it did in first negotiating the
Pacts, placed protection of its own confessional interests over general
provisions that would have equally protected the religious liberty of
all.
2 19
The secular left eventually compromised by agreeing to include
the Pacts in the Constitution, on the understanding that the Church and
the new Italian republic would renegotiate their provisions to bring them
into harmony with the Constitution. 220 This not only left the Church
221
entrenched in its traditional position of power and privilege, it also left
intact the odious Fascist-era requirement that non-Catholic religions
obtain express state permission before they could legally operate in Italy
222
as religions.
During what has become known as the "First Republic," the
Church strongly influenced Italian politics and government through its
ally, the Christian Democratic Party or "DC., 223 Although not .a
confessional party, the DC was subject to papal influence, as evidenced
by its formation of early coalition governments with post-war
monarchists and fascists to avoid sharing power with the Church's
218. LONG, supra note 189, at 215-16; 236; see also Ventura, supra note 95,
66, at 46.
[The] Constitution [of 1948] was not the Constitution of a
Catholic State. This could not be the Catholic State of the
Ancien Regime tradition, nor of the age of liberalism; nor of
course could it be a Catholic State in the Fascist sense.
Catholic Italy was still there, socially and politically, and to
some extent legally, but Italy was now framed with a
Constitution based on pluralism, freedom, and equality.
Id.
219. A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 164, at 848.
220. A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 44, 45; LONG,
supra note 189, at 318-19. See Ventura, supra note 95, 66, at 46.
221. A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 57.
222. Id. at 54; LONG, supra note 189, at 281-82; Pin, supra note 11, at 119.
223. A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 44; A. Ferrari,
Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 164, at 845; Pin, supra note 11, at 137; Ventura,
supra note 95, 67, at 46.
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• 224enemies on the secular left, its post-war policy of channeling national
tax dollars to the reconstruction of Catholic cathedrals destroyed in the
war, but not synagogues or Protestant churches, 225 and its determined
opposition to liberal reforms opposed by the Church, such as civil
divorce and abortion (legalized over papal and DC opposition only in the
226early 1970s and late 1980s, respectively).
The renegotiation of the Lateran Pacts was not concluded until
the Villa Madama Accords in 1984-almost 40 years after ratification of
the liberal-democratic Constitution and 20 years after the Second Vatican
Council belatedly endorsed freedom of religious belief and worship as
fundamental personal and group rights.2 The Accords eliminated the
Church's status as the state church of Italy, along with some of its related
privileges, though they permit Catholic teaching in public schools for
students who desire it, 228 and expressly note that Catholicism is part of
the "historical legacy" of the Italian people. Only after Villa Madama did
Italy ratify long-negotiated agreements that legally recognized Jewish
229and Protestant communities. Similar agreements with less familiar
groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints had to await the fall of the DC in 1992.
224. VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 238, 245-49. See BARBAGALLO, supra
note 161, at 15 (observing that even in the late 1940s the Church remained aligned
with the "authoritarianism of the right and struggled to adjust to political
democracy") (authors' translation); LONG, supra note 189, at 224 (observing that the
Church was fervently condemning liberalism as late as 1946); VENTRESCA, supra
note 191, at 243-45 (recounting Pius's sympathy for Italian monarchists and his
hostility to the left, including authorization of excommunication for any Catholic
member of the Italian Communist Party).
The DC often resisted papal overtures, making clear that it was a "center-left"
party "open to the right." See VENTRESCA, supra note 191, at 249.
225. LONG, supra note 189, at 293.
226. A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA, supra note 171, at 59, 60-61.
227. Ventura, supra note 95, 69, at 48. Italian courts had begun to undermine
the Lateran Pacts in the 1970s, see id. at 69, at 47-48, while an increasingly liberal
electorate foreshadowed that change was inevitable, id. 69 at 48,
228. Pin, supra note 11, at 118; Ventura, supra note 95, 71, at 49.
229. Ventura, supra note 95, 71, at 49.
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f Universal Protector of Human Rights
After the deconfessionalization of Italy and the demise of the
DC, the Church struggled to find a new political identity. Building on the
postwar myth that the Church had saved Italy from totalitarian disasters
230
on the right and the left , on the Vatican's recognition of universal
231
religious liberty, and finally on Villa Madama's express recognition of
Catholicism as an Italian historical-cultural legacy, 232 the Church
reconceptualized itself as a universal "human-dignity umbrella" which
sheltered all people in the exercise of the freedom of religion and belief,
regardless of the character of that belief or, indeed, unbelief. This
enabled a presentation of the Church as the guardian and protector of
233human rights for all Italians and, indeed, all of humankind. This
reasoning is evident in the Italian court opinions in Lautsi which contend
that the crucifix is a secular signifier of liberal-democratic values and the
historic relationship of the Italian people with Christianity.
234
Within the last two centuries, therefore, the Church whose
beliefs are ordinarily signified by the crucifix has:
(a) Ruled central Italy as an absolute monarch;
(b) Bitterly fought the unification and moderniz-
ation of Italy under a liberal (albeit anti-clerical
constitutional monarchy;
(c) Successfully overturned religious egalitarian
reforms and restored Catholicism as the privileged
state religion by aligning itself with Fascism
through the Lateran Pacts;
230. See A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 164, at 847-48.
231. See Calo, supra note 167, at 1-2. John Paul 11, the pope who oversaw the
deconfessionalization of Italy under the Villa Madama Accords, was also the pope
who made human rights a central concern of the Church. id. at 9.
232. See, e.g., A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 164, at 851; Pin,
supra note 11, at 121.
233. See Calo, supra note 167, at 1-2.
234. See supra Parts ll.B.2.a-b.
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(d) Officially navigated the shoals of the Fascist era
by prioritizing Catholic interests over those of
Italian and other European Jews, though some of
its clerics individually chose to protect and rescue
Jews from Fascist and Nazi threats;
(e) Blocked the establishment of a religiously imp-
artial liberal-democratic state for almost 40 years
after the fall of Fascism, contrary to express
constitutional guarantees and the unanimous
opposition of non-Catholics and the secular left;
and finally,
(f) Fashioned only in the last generation an identity
as protector of religious liberty and other human
rights for all Italians and all people.
It seems unlikely that Church teachings and practices of barely
30 years duration have displaced centuries in which the Church
subordinated unbelievers and non-Catholics to its own priorities and
235interests. But if the relatively brief periods in which the Church has
recognized personal religious freedom (about a half century) and
renounced its claims to preeminent status as the state religion of Italy
(about a quarter century) have indeed served to displace the ordinary
Catholic meaning of the crucifix, one would find confirmation in
contemporary Italian culture. One would see non-Catholic and
unbelieving Italians, as well as human rights and other secular activist
groups, using the crucifix as a secular sign of freedom of religion,
laicita's guarantee of state religious even-handedness, and secular human
rights for all humankind.
Unsurprisingly, non-Catholic and unbelieving use of the crucifix
is unknown in contemporary Italian culture. Neither Jews nor
Protestants nor Muslims, nor secular human rights organizations, nor
anyone other than the Church and its practicing Italian members uses the
235. Cf Beaman, supra note 10, at 96 (noting the dubious historical
assumption that all Italians-not just Italian Catholics-have experienced
Catholicism as an unqualified good that has not infringed religious or other
freedoms); A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 164, at 841 (suggesting that
rather than a unifying civil religion Italy has had "a church-religion aiming to
establish a 'protected democracy' . . . subordinated to the objectives and non-
negotiable values of a single church").
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crucifix as a secular symbol. Italian cultural usage---or, rather, lack
thereof--confirms that the crucifix has not acquired any secular meaning
that is independent of its ordinary Catholic confessional meaning.
III. CROSS, CRUCIFIX, AND CULTURATION
The decisions in Buono and Lautsi each rest on two premises.
First, they expressly acknowledge that the cross and the crucifix each
ordinarily have confessional meaning.' 36 Second, they implicitly assume
that the State's adopting or endorsing this religious or confessional
meaning would be unconstitutional; this is evident from Buono's
assertion of an extraordinary secular meaning for the cross when
237displayed at veterans memorials, the Italian courts' assertion of
extraordinary meanings for the crucifix when displayed in public school
classrooms, and Lautsi's extraordinary assertion that the crucifix has,239
no confessional meaning or effect at all in an Italian public school.
These premises are also evident in each decision's assertion of an
extraordinary meaning for each symbol: honor and memory of all
military dead, in case of Buono and the cross, and the Christian-Catholic
roots of universal human rights and Italian culture (to which the ECtHR
deferred under the margin of appreciation doctrine), in case of Lautsi and
the crucifix. These alternate secular meanings are not obvious from their
ordinary confessional counterparts-indeed, they subvert or deny the
symbol's theological significance. Of course, if the confessional
meanings were not constitutionally problematic, there would have been
no need to substitute the less obvious secular meanings adopted by the
USSCt and the Italian courts, or to deny confessional meaning altogether,
as did the ECtHR.
Buono and Lautsi defend the alternate secular meanings for the
cross and the crucifix in two ways. First, they deemphasize the ordinary
religious or confessional meaning of the symbols; because such
meanings undermine the plausibility of any alternate secular meaning, a
court that intends to uphold the symbol gains nothing by emphasizing its
236. See supra Parts II.A.I, II.B.1.
237. See supra Part II.A.2.
238. See supra Parts II.B.2.a-b.
239. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
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confessional content. And second, they erase the effect of the cross and
the crucifix. Buono does this by suggesting that there is no Establishment
Clause harm-that is, no legally cognizable "endorsement" effect-if the
symbol conveys a secular message.140 Lautsi accomplishes the same
thing more directly, emphasizing the crucifix's "passivity" and the lack
of any evidence that non-Catholic children were treated badly or
differently in Italian classrooms where the crucifix is displayed.241
But merely positing a possible secular meaning for a
confessional symbol is hardly decisive of the constitutional question: The
government can nearly always articulate a possible secular meaning for
the ordinarily confessional symbols that it uses. What matters is not the
possibility of an alternate secular meaning, but its actual existence-not
whether a secular meaning is imaginable, but whether it is present and
recognizable in the history and culture of the society in which it is
242displayed. The meaning of a sign is in principle indeterminate, but it
does not follow, as judges sometimes suppose, 243 that a sign can mean
240. See supra Part II.A.2.
241. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
242. See supra Part I.C.
243. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474-76 (2009)
(Alito, J., plurality opinion) (arguing the impossibility of determining a city
monument's meaning).
Although it did not raise any Establishment Clause issues, Summum did suggest
that a government which accepts the private donation of a religious monument does
not necessarily adopt the religious motivation of the donor or the religious meaning
the donor might ascribe to the donated symbol. 555 U.S. at 474, 476. Our approach
is consistent with this holding. We have argued that in evaluating government use of
religious symbols under the Establishment Clause, courts should determine (i)
whether a symbol appropriated by government has an ordinary confessional or
religious meaning, (ii) whether there exists a plausible alternate secular meaning;
and (iii) whether that alternate meaning is authentic-that is, truly present in the
history or culture of the place where the symbol is displayed. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-15 and Part 1. Our analysis does not conclusively presume
that the Latin cross in Buono could only have had Christian meaning, nor would we
have conclusively presumed a confessional or religious meaning for the Ten
Commandments monument in Summum (if the Establishment Clause had been at
issue in that case). Though the symbols at issue in both cases possessed an ordinarily
confessional or religious meaning, plausible secular meanings were offered by the
government in each case-honoring the sacrifices of members of the service fallen
in battle, in Buono, and recognizing those groups which are important to the city's
current life or past history, in Summum. The critical inquiry in both cases was the
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anything.244 The meaning of a sign is specified by its overall context-
not just the immediate context in which it is displayed (a veterans
245
memorial, a public school classroom), but also the history and culture
of the place where it is displayed (the United States, Italy).
41
As we have seen, the purported secular meanings asserted for the
cross and the crucifix are culturally inauthentic. The cultural histories to
which the courts appeal in their respective efforts to prove these secular
meanings obscure a predominant confessional meaning, and one cannot
find unbelievers or minority believers in either the United States or Italy
who themselves use these symbols in a manner that would confirm the
secular meanings that courts have projected onto them. 247
The cross may be a commonly displayed cultural symbol in the
United States, and the crucifix such a symbol in Italy, but it does not
follow that they are secular symbols. Rather, they are remnants of a
once-predominant Christian culture (Protestant in the United States,
Catholic in Italy) that no longer exists as it once did. As sociological data
makes clear, both cross and crucifix have become "deculturated,"
alienated from the culture where they once enjoyed a natural and
privileged place. As Professor Beaman has pointed out, deculturation
explains the ironic self-presentation of these traditionally dominant
248
religions as embattled cultural minorities.
In short, neither cross nor crucifix is any longer culturally at
home as a confessional symbol. The United States is no longer a
predominantly Protestant culture, and is fading as a seriously Christian
one. For example, the newly elected president of the Southern Baptist
third part of our approach, whether these proffered secular meanings are authentic as
well as merely plausible-that is, truly present in the history and culture of the place
displaying the symbol.
As we have concluded, there is no basis for believing that the meaning ascribed
to the cross by the Buono plurality is really present in United States history and
culture, as evidenced by the fact that it does not honor nonbelievers and
nonChristians; whether the Ten Commandments signify a group that currently or
historically is important to the city in Summum would have been a matter for
investigation had that case been decided under the Establishment Clause.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
245. See supra Parts I.A.2, ll.B.2.
246. See supra Parts I1.A.3, l1.B.3.
247. See supra Parts II.A.3, lI.B.3.
248. Beaman, supra note 10, at 90.
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Convention's Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, Russell Moore,
has declared that evangelicals "are no longer the moral majority," but a
"prophetic minority. ' '249 Self-declared Protestants now constitute a bare250
majority of adults in the United States, and Christianity (especially
evangelical Protestantism) is declining as a major American cultural
influence. 251 Non-Christians, unaffiliated believers, and unbelievers now
212
constitute over a fifth of the population, and have more than doubled
in the just the last two decades. The trend is starker among young people:
Only four in ten young adults ages 18 to 29 self-identify as Protestant,
253and one in four is either an unbeliever or unaffiliated with a religion.
Perhaps most telling, large majorities of Americans do not believe that
their religion is the only way to heaven, or that there is significant
conflict between belief and contemporary secular society.
254
249. Naomi Schaefer Riley, Russell Moore: From Moral Majority to
"Prophetic Minority, " WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2013 ("Mr. Moore is among the
leaders of a new generation who think that evangelicals need to recognize that their
values no longer define mainstream American culture the way they did 50 or even 20
years ago," and who believe "that Christians must return to the days when they were
a moral example and vanguard-defenders of belief in a larger unbelieving
culture.").
250. U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, Report 1: Religious Affiliation-
Summary of Key Findings, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE 5 (June 2008)
[hereinafter Religious Affiliation Survey Findings], available at
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-key-findings.pdf.
For the full report, see http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-
study-full.pdf.
251. See HUNTER, supra note 38, at 79-92.
252. Religious Affiliation Survey Findings, supra note 250, at 5 (summing
percentages for "Other Religions" (4.7%) and "Unaffiliated" (16.1%)).
253. Religious Affiliation Survey Findings, supra note 250, at 7.
254. U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, Report 2: Religious Beliefs &
Practices/Social and Political Views-Summary of Key Findings, PEW FORUM ON
RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, 3-4 [hereinafter Religious Beliefs Survey Findings] (June
2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2religious-landscape-
study-key-findings.pdf; accord ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID CAMPBELL, AMERICAN
GRACE: How RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US 80-133 (2010) (arguing that the
dramatic increase in disaffiliation and unbelief in young adults is a reaction to
conservative Christian political activism in the 1980s and 1990s). For the full Pew
report, see http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-study-
full.pdf.
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Though Italy is among the more religious of the EU countries,"'
its culture is also secularizing, as evidenced by large and growing gaps
between Italian practice and Catholic teachings. Rates of Catholic
baptisms, first communion, confirmation, and marriages have shown
substantial declines in just the last 15 years. 216 These data on so-called
Catholic "rites of passage" are far more telling than frequently cited
figures about attendance at mass (which, in any event, has also dropped
precipitously over the last generation). Another clear indicator is the
radically new understanding of "family" in Italian society: The data point
to
the emergence of a new family model in Italy,
which is completely opposite to the one promoted
by the Catholic Church. There are increasing
numbers of couples without children, single
parents, and divorced parents who remarry or
choose to cohabit. Family formation is changing
and following the pattern of other advanced
Western countries. 257
An overwhelming majority of Italian Catholics opposes Church
intervention in Italian politics, 258 and the result of most referenda relating
to practices opposed by the Church has been rejection of the Catholic
259position.
In short, "a process of secularization is taking place in Italy that
is slow but continuous. The process of transformation is oriented towards
a more flexible attitude in applying the Catholic precepts and sometimes
a growing disinterest towards these precepts by the Italian people. 260
255. See, e.g., Barry Kosmin, France, Italy and Spain: Political Secularism
and Public Opinion, in SECULARISM, WOMEN & THE STATE: THE MEDITERRANEAN
WORLD IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 29, 32-33 (2009) [hereinafter SECULARISM].
256. Silvia Sansonetti, Social Indicators of Secularization in Italy, in
SECULARISM, supra note 255, at 137-39.
257. Sansonetti, supra note 256, at 140. See also R. CARTOCCI, GEOGRAFIA
DELL' ITALIA CATTOLICA (2011).
258. Kosmin, supra note 255, at 35.
259. See Sansonetti, supra note 256, at 140.
260. Sansonetti, supra note 256, at 149.
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Both the United States and Italy are confronted with increasing
secularization and growing demands from believers, unbelievers, faith
communities, and other groups that government take into account
specific aspects of their belief or unbelief when it acts-especially when
it adopts or displays symbols. A paradox is evident: On the one hand,
there is a growing national "identitarian" narrative, focused on a
presupposed confessional identity or affiliation of the people with
"Judeo-Christianity" in the United States and Roman Catholicism in
Italy, while on the other, statistical data confirm the steady secularizing
of individual behavior and the widening gulf between these purported
identifications and popular culture. The triumphant "return of religion"
has not in reality been confirmed by empirical data on religious practice
and belief.
As Professor Roy has shown, "religion" is now less a faith than a
cultural phenomenon. 261 We see this in both Buono and Lautsi. The
confessional elements of both cross and crucifix are losing their cultural
salience-it can no longer be assumed, in other words, that the
confessional referent of each sign is widely accepted and approved by
Americans and Italians. As a consequence, the government could not
defend its use of cross or crucifix on the basis of its confessional
meaning. Defenses of each symbol sought instead to "re-acculturate" it,
by turning it into a secular symbol that is at home in the secularizing
cultures of the United States and Italy.
The importance of careful cultural analysis is well illustrated by
Professor Weiler's argument before the ECtHR's Grand Chamber on
262behalf of eight intervening countries in Lautsi & Others, widely
credited with persuading the Grand Chamber to overturn the prior
Second Section decision invalidating classroom display of the crucifix.
263
Like the Italian lower courts, Weiler spent most of his argument talking
about religious symbols other than the crucifix. He noted the wide range
of practices with respect to government use of religious language and
symbols in Europe-established churches, constitutional invocations of
261. See Part I.C.
262. See Joseph Weiler, "Oral Submission on Behalf of Armenia, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Russia, and San Marino" (June 30, 2012),
available at http://icon.oxfordjoumals.org/content/8/2/157.full; Lautsi & Others.
263. See, e.g., Pierre-Henri Pr6lot, The Lautsi Decision as Seen from
(Christian) Europe, 65 ME. L. REV. 783 (2013); Lautsi & Others.
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the Trinity, crosses on national flags-the last especially powerful
because national flags are simultaneously object and source of
nationhood. 264 He argued for a kind of group pluralism-a plurality of
responses among nations, thus inviting the Court's application of the
265
margin of appreciation doctrine, and ignoring the powerful
constitutional convergence trends documented by Professors Annichino,
266Silvio Ferrari, and Haupt, among others.
Within the "non-lal'que" or confessional states he represented
(which notably did not include a single predominantly Protestant nation),
Weiler argued, "the continued entanglement of religious symbols in its
public square and by the State is accepted by the secular population as a
part of national identity and as an act of tolerance towards their co-
nationals," this latter presumably a reference to those practicing the
historically dominant Roman Catholicism or Christian Orthodoxy in such
267
countries. There is no doubt that crosses on national flags have
authentic-and by now close to exclusive-nonconfessional, secular
meaning. Unbelieving and most non-Christian Norwegians and Finns
and English who trek to the World Cup or the Olympics seem not to have
any qualms about waving the symbol of their country-cross and all-in
support of national teams and athletes. Like the Christmas tree, crosses
on national flags are symbols whose ordinary confessional meaning has
long since been displaced by an alternate secular one, easily confirmed
by this ubiquitous use by unbelievers and non-Christians.
But has the crucifix achieved this status? Weiler didn't say, and
offered no evidence that it has. He argued that the "message of tolerance
towards the Other" properly written into the European Convention
"should not be translated into a message of intolerance towards one's
own identity," suggesting that removing crucifixes from public school
classrooms would have precisely that effect for Italians. 268 But this
264. Weiler, supra note 262, at 12-13.
265. Weiler, supra note 262, at 15.
266. See, e.g., Annicchino, supra note 6, at 182-83; Silvio Ferrari, The
Strasbourg Court and Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights: A
Quantitative Analysis of the Case Law, in THE LAUTS! PAPERS, supra note 11, at 14,
29 [hereinafter S. Ferrari, THE LAUTSI PAPERS]; Haupt, Transnational Establishment,
supra note 2.
267. Weiler, supra note 262, at 15.
268. Weiler, supra note 262, at 16 (emphasis added).
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begged the question before the court: Of whose identity did he speak?
Which Italians? Baptist, Buddhist, Jehovah's Witness, Jewish, Mormon,
Muslim, and other non-Catholic and unbelieving Italians, of whom there
are ever increasing numbers? Unless there is an alternate
nonconfessional meaning for the crucifix that is authentically present and
genuinely recognized in Italian culture, the "lost identity" of which
Weiler so passionately spoke is not that of the Italian people, but only
that of Italian Catholics and their Church.
Weiler invoked the timeworn argument that absence of
government-displayed symbols equates to government endorsement of
unbelief, using a homely analogy of "Marco," whose atheist/agnostic
family intentionally lacks a crucifix, and "Leonardo," whose believing
Catholic family cannot imagine their home without one. Weiler thus
encouraged the European Court of Human Rights to conclude that Marco
and Leonardo would both understand their public school to have
endorsed atheism if it lacked crucifix.
2 69
The Italian state, of course, is not a private actor whose influence
is confined to a single household like Weiler's fictional families; the
Italian state acts for all its citizens, as must all liberal democratic
270
states. Weiler, again, does not explain how a state's use of a
confessional symbol that lacks an alternate, nonconfessional meaning in
Italian history and culture can represent dissident Catholic, non-Catholic,
271
and unbelieving Italians.
In a narrow sense, Weiler's efforts in Lautsi and similar
arguments in Buono were successful: The memorial cross was allowed to
stay (for the present) in Buono, as was the classroom crucifix in Lautsi;
"religion" lives on for another day in the public square. But there is no
actual U.S. culture, no real society, in which the cross possesses the
secular meanings attributed to it by the USSCt. Nor is there any actual
Italian culture, or real society, in which classroom display of the crucifix
reflects the open and welcoming nonconfessional "tradition" of which
the Italian courts spoke and to which the Grand Chamber deferred under
the margin of appreciation.
269. Weiler, supra note 262, at 25-27.
270. See S. Ferrari, THE LAUTSI PAPERS, supra note 266, at 29; Haupt,
Transnational Nonestablishment, supra note 2, at 1028-29.
271. See Weiler, supra note 262.
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Similar arguments can be made against the position taken by
Professor Cardia, who served as a consultant to the Italian government in
12preparing the Italian government's submission to the Grand Chamber.
Like the Italian courts, Cardia dubiously concludes that "the symbol of
the cross"-as in the Italian court decisions "crucifix" seems to
disappear-"does not belong to one church or another: It belongs to
Christianity, to the faith of each of us, even to the heart of one who,
lacking other faiths, recognizes its universal meaning.
2 7 1
A pretense of "reacculturation" is at work here, a shallow
trivialization and stereotyping of formerly powerful religious narratives
symbolized by the cross and the crucifix, effected by attributing
nonconfessional meaning to obviously confessional symbols and
embedding that meaning in a nonexistent, imaginary "culture" so as to
create the illusion of acculturation.
Part of the impulse to this "synthetic" re-acculturation is
understandably strategic: By attributing secular meaning to religious
symbols, confessional groups and their advocates show courts how to
defend government use of these symbols, and thus also how to preserve
274
an apparent union of religion and national culture. These efforts also
betray a kind of cultural schizophrenia: Many believers-and especially
the leaders of conservative Christian confessions-rail against the
secularization of culture and its subversion of belief, yet they insist that
their symbols and the confessional beliefs they signify are still at home in
this ever more secular and unbelieving culture. But these symbols
continue to fit, if at all, only as something other than the confessional
symbols they are-hence the redefinition of such symbols as secular even
and especially by the religions that use them and with which they have
traditionally been associated.
Most ironic is the likelihood that judicial re-definition of
religious symbols as secular will actually accelerate and entrench the
275
secularization that traditionally dominant religions deplore. As
272. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
273. CARDIA, supra note 11, at 137 (commenting on the Second Section
opinion) (authors' translation).
274. Bartrum, supra note 11, at 1662-63.
275. See Scharffs, supra note 32, at 58; Berg, supra note 7, at 42-43 ("An
obvious distortion or dilution of religion occurs if courts validate religious symbolic
displays on the ground . . . that the displays have no religious meaning or serve
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Professor Roy has concluded, the challenge is not a "clash between
different cultures, it is a separation of culture and religion.,
276
CONCLUSION: ACCULTURATION OR WITNESS?
James Davison Hunter has argued that
[t]he goal for Christians .. .is not and never has
been to "take back the culture" or to "take over the
culture" or to "win the culture wars" or to "save
Western civilization." Ours is now, emphatically, a
post-Christian culture, and the community of
Christian believers are now, more than ever-
spiritually speaking-exiles in a land of exile.
Christians, as with the Israelites in Jeremiah's
account, must come to terms with this exile.
2 77
The temptation to dominate and politicize culture, Hunter
continues, transforms "Christian public witness into the opposite of the
witness Christianity is supposed to offer., 278 Creating disingenuous
accounts of imaginary history and inventing secular meanings that have
no cultural existence do not serve as Christian witness, but as ironic and
cynical manipulation.
Professor Berg has concluded that if allowing the state to define
the meaning of religious symbols will inevitably end in their
merely a historical or ceremonial function."); S. Ferrari, supra note 2, at 16-17 ("[A]
cultural defense of the crucifix implicitly devalues its religious significance and,
indirectly, endorses the principle that a symbol can be displayed in a public
institution only if the symbol has no religious character."); cf Hill, Ceremonial
Deism, supra note 12 (arguing that religious phrases and symbols have lost their
religious meaning through repeated display and use).
276. ROY, supra note 38, at 115.
277. HUNTER, supra note 38, at 280; accord Riley, supra note 249 (noting a
"new generation" of evangelical leaders "who think that evangelicals need to
recognize that their values no longer define mainstream American culture the way
they did 50 or even 20 years ago," and who believe "that Christians must return to
the days when they were a moral example and vanguard--defenders of belief in a
larger unbelieving culture").
278. HUNTER, supra note 38, at 280.
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secularization, "then the only way for the state to acknowledge its limits
is by remaining silent and leaving statements about transcendent reality
to the initiative of private individuals and groups in civil society., 279 We
agree, and believe this would be a salutary development for religion as
well as government. Religion's conceding and cooperating with
government in the desacralizing of sacred symbols will only dilute the
authentic testimony of religions and believers who are already estranged
from Western culture. In this respect, Buono and Lautsi were anything
but good news for belief.
279. Berg, supra note 7, at 47.
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